Critical minerals

Trade in critical minerals shapes energy transition, digital transformation and industrial development worldwide

Rethinking the role of critical minerals for development

The global shift toward a low-carbon economy has intensified the demand for critical minerals, placing resource-rich developing countries at the centre of a new geopolitical and economic landscape. In this context, UNCTAD plays a role from the development perspective by promoting fair, inclusive and sustainable trade in critical minerals. UNCTAD also co-led the Secretariat of the United Nations Secretary-General’s Panel on Critical Energy Transition Minerals -—
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, which focused on how to guide critical energy transition minerals towards equity and justice.

The UN Panel defines critical energy transition minerals as minerals necessary to construct, produce, distribute and store renewable energy, including copper, cobalt, nickel, lithium, graphite, REEs and aluminum required for electric vehicles and battery storage; and silicon, cadmium, tellurium and selenium (among others) that build solar panels. Wind and hydropower, for instance, require copper and chromium, zinc and aluminium -—
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Energy transition offers developing economies a major opportunity to boost development by moving up the critical minerals value chain.
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highlights the urgent need for resource-rich regions to move beyond exporting raw minerals to increasing the economic value of their mineral resources. Foreign direct investment plays a key role in supporting this transition by helping resource-rich countries build local refining and processing capacities and move up the mineral value chain. The Africa Green Minerals Strategy highlights that the continent holds a substantial share of global reserves of minerals essential for the energy transition, including over 50% of global cobalt, 40% of manganese and significant deposits of lithium, REEs and PGM -—
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. The Democratic Republic of Congo illustrates this potential: by processing its cobalt locally, the country nearly tripled its export value, with $6 billion cobalt exports in 2022, compared to $167 million from previously unprocessed cobalt -—
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. In Latin America and the Caribbean, a major supplier of lithium and copper, the challenge is to shift away from enclave-style extraction that is economically isolated toward integrating extraction into national, higher value-added industrial activities.

At COP29, UNCTAD outlined four strategic priorities to address a $225 billion investment gap in mining projects across developing economies: investment in infrastructure, fairer trade rules, transparent governance and knowledge sharing -—
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, aligning with the UN Panel’s principles on equitable benefit-sharing.

At the international investment policy level, a number of recent IIAs include specific provisions facilitating and promoting investment in energy and raw materials. These provisions aim to improve the investment environment and remove ground-level obstacles for investors’ activities. Certain recent IIAs for instance provide for the transparency and simplification of procedures for investment in raw materials (see e.g. the European Union-New Zealand FTA -—
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). When aligned with countries’ national critical minerals strategies, IIAs can support industrial and investment policy objectives for strategic mineral resources. At the same time, IIAs composed of thousands of agreements may limit space to regulate critical minerals’ extraction and exploitation and raise the risk of costly investor-state disputes. For example, at least five cases in 2024 involved the mining of critical minerals, such as copper -—
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, lithium -—
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, titanium potentially contained in heavy mineral sands deposits -—
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, and zinc -—
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This SDG Pulse In-Focus provides data-driven analysis of trade and production of critical minerals and proposes UNCTAD’s list of critical minerals. This work builds on the UN Panel’s definition adding to it a review of minerals strategic for developing economies, mapping existing classifications of critical minerals, and offering statistical analysis of what makes minerals critical for both developed and developing economies.

Toward a comprehensive list of critical minerals for trade and development

UNCTAD considers minerals1 critical not only by their global importance and supply risks but by their relevance for trade and development, reflecting the priorities of developing economies. A mineral is considered critical if it supports structural transformation, energy and digital transitions, or industrial upgrading, while it might also pose supply risks, or offer trade opportunities.

UNCTAD’s 60 critical minerals guide developing economies to leverage trade and growth opportunities in the energy transition.

This list of 60 critical minerals mapped to 499 harmonized system (HS) codes can inform the analysis of global trade in minerals and support SDG-aligned national strategies. The data enables analysis of trade dependence, export restrictions, production concentration and value-added potential. While the current list focuses on raw and semi-processed minerals and metals, it could be further expanded in the future to enable the analysis of processed critical minerals and their role in circular economy and global value chains (see the full list in annex 2.). All subsequent analysis draws on this UNCTAD list and its categorization.

Figure 1. UNCTAD’s list of critical minerals by role in energy transition and other areas Figure 1. UNCTAD’s list of critical minerals by role in energy transition and other areas

As part of this approach, minerals were grouped by their relevance to the energy transition into three categories: those required for the transition (27) (e.g., cobalt, copper, lithium, REEs), relevant to it (10) (e.g., iron ore and steel, palladium, zirconium), and other critical minerals (23) (e.g., gold, gypsum, lead, silver). This distinction helps highlight which materials are under increasing geopolitical and economic scrutiny due to their strategic importance in clean energy technologies. Indeed, this supports targeted analysis of materials essential to technologies like electric vehicles, solar panels and hydrogen systems. Critical status was then assessed using two key indicators, Revealed Comparative Advantage and Trade Concentration Index (for both exports and imports), to classify minerals into high, moderate, or low criticality. See annex 1. for the full list of methodological steps.

Trade in critical minerals reached $2.5 trillion in 2023, with Asia emerging as the world’s largest importing market

In 2023, global trade in raw and semi-processed minerals reached approximately $2.57 trillion in imports and $2.52 trillion in exports. This trade segment represented over 10% of total global exports, highlighting its critical role in the international economy.

Regionally, Asia emerged as the largest market for critical minerals, accounting for $1.5 trillion in imports, more than half of the global total—while exporting only $825 billion, with China accounting for roughly 40 per cent of imports in the Asia region. This substantial trade deficit of around $680 billion underscores Asia's role as the primary global hub for processing and manufacturing activities that relies heavily on critical mineral inputs.

Asia imports over half the world’s critical minerals, while Africa and Oceania emerge as critical mineral suppliers.

In contrast, Africa, the Americas and Oceania recorded significant trade surpluses, indicating their dominant roles as suppliers of critical minerals. Africa exported nearly $266 billion reflecting a share of 10.6% of world trade, while importing only $68 billion, and Oceania, despite relatively low import volumes, exported over $239 billion. The Americas also showed strong export performance, with a surplus of nearly $194 billion. Europe maintained a more balanced trade profile, with exports slightly exceeding imports. These patterns highlight the global supply chain structure, where mineral-rich regions provide essential inputs for the energy transition, while industrialized and manufacturing-heavy regions, particularly Asia, drive demand. These trade patterns also reflect underlying investment trends in extraction and processing, which shape the geography of mineral value chains.

Figure 2. Asia imports over half the world’s critical minerals, while Africa and Oceania emerge as critical mineral suppliers Figure 2. Asia imports over half the world’s critical minerals, while Africa and Oceania emerge as critical mineral suppliers
Total value exports and imports of raw and semi-processed critical minerals, by region, in billions of dollars, 2005-2023

Source: UNCTAD calculations based on UN Comtrade Database -—
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Minerals required for energy transition drive $773 billion in exports – one third of the total exports of critical minerals

In 2023, global exports of critical minerals required for energy transition amounted to $773 billion (31% of global exports of critical minerals), $674 billion (27%) for minerals relevant to energy transition, and $1,078 billion (43%) for all other critical minerals.

In 2023, minerals required for energy transition accounted for over 40% of total critical mineral exports, reaching $773 billion globally.

Critical mineral exports grew significantly from 2005 to 2023 across all regions, with Asia and Europe leading in total values. Asia shows the most significant and sustained increase, driven largely by exports of other critical minerals and those relevant to energy transition. The Americas display fluctuating trends among the three segments of critical minerals, with strong overall growth, while Africa records steady growth with a gradual rise in energy-transition-related minerals. Oceania, though starting from a lower base, shows consistent increased and a balanced export mix. Overall, the data reflects increasing global supply for critical minerals, especially for clean energy minerals, such as cobalt, copper, lithium, nickel and REEs.

Figure 3. Exports of energy transition minerals increased until 2022, most in Asia and Europe Figure 3. Exports of energy transition minerals increased until 2022, most in Asia and Europe
Regional exports of raw and semi-processed critical minerals in value, by category of energy-transition-related minerals, in billions of dollars

Source: UNCTAD calculations based on UN Comtrade Database -—
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Data show deep bilateral dependencies in critical minerals’ trade

Australia and China are each other's largest minerals trading partners with $95 billion of bilateral trade in 2023.

In 2023, global trade in critical minerals revealed deep bilateral dependencies. Australia emerged as the top exporter by trade value, with over $231 billion in critical mineral exports, primarily to China, Japan and India. Other major exporters included the United States and China. Notable trade corridors included Australia–China ($95 billion), Hong Kong–China ($43 billion) and Canada–United States ($41 billion). Several bilateral flows exceeded $10 billion, including those between the Democratic Republic of Congo and China, the United Arab Emirates and India, and Brazil and China, underscoring Asia’s central role as a demand hub. These patterns highlight the strategic concentration of mineral supply chains.

Map 1. Bilateral flows reveal key trade corridors for critical minerals in Asia and Northern America
Trade values in millions of dollars, 2023

Source: UNCTAD calculations based on UN Comtrade Database -—
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Battery and electric vehicle manufacturing affect the top traded minerals globally

Copper, aluminium and nickel are the top traded critical minerals essential for energy transition, together with other energy-relevant minerals, such as iron ore and steel, sulphur and potassium.

Africa emerged as the breakout performer in copper, nearly doubling exports (+98.2% to $44 billion) to meet surging demand for electrical infrastructure and electric vehicles. The continent also led nickel growth with a remarkable 122.8% surge, while Asia's nickel exports more than doubled (+107.5% to $15 billion), fuelled by battery manufacturing needs.

Key minerals, such as iron ore/steel and copper, have seen the largest trade growth of all non-gold minerals since 2019.

Iron ore maintained its position as an important industrial mineral, with Asia's exports growing 52.8% to $192 billion – underscoring ongoing steel demand. Oceania's iron ore shipments grew steadily (+33.7% to $94 billion), although outpaced by its metallurgical coal expansion.

Energy transition needs are significantly reshaping trade flows of critical minerals as reflected by the top 10 globally exported minerals, with regions rich in critical metals gaining strategic economic leverage.

Figure 4. Exports of minerals needed for energy and digital transitions significantly up from 2019 Figure 4. Exports of minerals needed for energy and digital transitions significantly up from 2019
Top 10 globally exported minerals by region, in billions of dollars, 2019 and 2023

Source: UNCTAD calculations based on UN Comtrade Database -—
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Note: The top 10 exported minerals were identified based on total global export values in 2019-2023.
Gold exports from Europe largely reflect refined gold and may include significant volumes of re-exports and re-imports.

Top mineral producers aren’t always the top exporters

Critical mineral production and trade patterns reveal untapped opportunities for value addition and economic diversification in resource-rich developing economies.

Data reveal striking patterns of concentration in the production of critical minerals: China leads in aluminium and REEs, while the Democratic Republic of Congo dominates cobalt. Australia is the top producer of lithium, and Chile remains the foremost copper producer. However, production statistics are not mapped to HS codes, which are used in trade reporting. This disconnect makes it difficult to directly compare raw production with export volumes. Complementary investment data - particularly from project- and firm-level databases - can help fill this gap by identifying where production and processing facilities are being established by multinational firms -—
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. Still, a compelling narrative emerges; for instance, China, while being the top producer of several minerals, is not always the top exporter. This suggests high domestic consumption or value-added processing, where raw materials are transformed into intermediate or final products before being exported. Similarly, South Africa, which accounts for over 80% of global platinum and other PMG production, exports less raw material than expected, as much of it is refined domestically before entering global markets. These dynamics underscore the importance of looking beyond extraction to understand the full picture of mineral flows and economic strategy and of developing a full list that identifies final goods that depend on critical minerals.

Figure 5. Explore the top 5 mineral producers, by mineral Figure 5. Explore the top 5 mineral producers, by mineral
Mineral production for top five producers (2021-2023 average) and the Rest of the World, share
Select a mineral:

Source: UNCTAD calculations based on World Mining Data -—
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Note: The top 5 producing economies were identified based on total production values in 2023. The production data for minerals is not directly comparable with the UNCTAD list of critical minerals due to differences in classification systems between production statistics and trade data. While trade data is categorized using HS codes, production data is based on mineral outputs that are not always mapped one-to-one with HS-coded traded products. Although efforts were made to align the two datasets, discrepancies remain, as some minerals reported in production statistics may not correspond exactly to those captured in trade flows. Therefore, caution is needed when interpreting which minerals are produced and traded, and when comparing both series.

Trade in critical minerals highly regionally specialized

Critical mineral trade is deeply localized: Africa, South America and Oceania lead in exports,Asia and Europe rely on imports.

Figure 6 shows that Africa emerges as a dominant net exporter of critical minerals such as cobalt, manganese and platinum, reflecting its rich geological endowment and growing role in global supply chains. However, it remains reliant on imports for minerals like boron and arsenic (the latter being important for gold processing), largely due to limited domestic production capacity. Oceania, particularly Australia, plays a pivotal role as a global supplier of iron ore, nickel and zinc, yet depends on external sources for potassium and fluorspar. Asia, driven by its vast industrial base, mainly in China, faces substantial trade deficits in cobalt, manganese and chromium, although it maintains a competitive edge in the export of REEs and graphite. Europe presents a mixed profile: while it shows net surpluses in refined gold, palladium and other PMG, these are primarily the result of its advanced refining infrastructure (especially for gold) rather than raw material extraction. At the same time, Europe remains a net importer of manganese, zirconium and graphite. The Americas maintain a relatively balanced trade position, with strong exports of lithium, copper and zinc, but continue to import chromium and manganese to meet industrial demand.

Figure 6. Trade surpluses and deficits across regions underscore global interdependence in critical mineral supply Figure 6. Trade surpluses and deficits across regions underscore global interdependence in critical mineral supply
(Normalized net trade in minerals balance, by continent, 2023)

Source: UNCTAD calculations based on UN Comtrade Database -—
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Note: Net mineral trade balance values is calculated according to the following formula: (X_{ji} - M_{ji})/(X_{ji} + M_{ji}) where i refers to specific Mineral (or its commodity composition), j … economy (or group of economies), X_{ji} … economy’s j exports of specific mineral commodity/mineral category i to World M_{ji} … economy’s j imports of specific mineral commodity/mineral commodity category i from World. Net mineral trade balance values range between -1 and 1. The positive value indicates that an economy has net exports or surplus. The negative values mean a deficit, indicating that the economy imports more than it exports.

Export restrictions shape critical minerals’ trade

Upward trend of export restrictions on energy-related minerals.

Export restrictions can generate supply uncertainties and influence global prices, as well as investment decisions. The data show a clear pattern: minerals required for energy transition—such as copper, zinc, germanium and others, tin and nickel—face a significantly higher and growing number of export restrictions compared to other traded critical minerals. This trend reflects rising geopolitical sensitivities and growing domestic value-chain ambitions in producing countries. In contrast, minerals not directly linked to new energy technologies generally experience fewer trade restrictions. The heatmap below highlights how critical minerals are subjected to export restrictions, which may affect supply security for energy transition worldwide.

Figure 7. Rising restrictions on exports of critical minerals could disrupt energy transition Figure 7. Rising restrictions on exports of critical minerals could disrupt energy transition
Total number of export restrictions, by mineral, 2019-2023

Source: UNCTAD calculations based on -—
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Note: Total number of export restrictions corresponds to aggregated policy measures including export taxes, quotas, licensing requirements, export bans, minimum export prices, VAT rebate reductions and other administrative controls -—
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. The radiant color indicates the intensity of export restrictions. The number of critical minerals shown in this figure differs from those used in the trade analysis. The database includes only minerals identified as critical raw materials by -—
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and for which data is available under HS 6-digit codes (HS07 classification).

When examining critical minerals essential for the energy transition, the highest number of export restrictions between 2019 and 2023 were imposed by countries such as Democratic Republic of Congo, Mongolia, India, Burundi and Zambia. These restrictions primarily target key minerals including copper (notably in Democratic Republic of Congo, Mongolia, Zambia and Argentina), molybdenum (Mongolia), and a group of high-tech or strategic minerals such as gallium, germanium, indium, niobium, tantalum and vanadium (notably in Burundi and Ethiopia). Zinc has also been subject to restrictions, particularly in India, Burundi and Ethiopia.

Figure 8. Countries like Democratic Republic of Congo, Mongolia and India account for most export restrictions on energy-transition minerals Figure 8. Countries like Democratic Republic of Congo, Mongolia and India account for most export restrictions on energy-transition minerals
Number of export restrictions by country for critical minerals required for energy transition, average over 2019-2023

Source: UNCTAD calculations based on -—
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Note: This chart displays the average number of export restrictions by country from 2019 to 2023, focusing on countries with the highest levels of restrictions. Each country has its top two most frequently restricted minerals highlighted in distinct colours. All the rest of the minerals are marked in grey. The number of critical minerals shown in this figure differs from those used in the trade analysis. The database includes only minerals identified as critical raw materials by -—
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and for which data is available under HS 6-digit codes (HS07 classification).

Critical minerals are exposed to high illicit financial flow risks

UNCTAD, as a co-custodian of SDG indicator 16.4.1 on illicit financial flows with UNODC, has supported pilot studies in several developing economies revealing that minerals such as gold, copper and cobalt are particularly vulnerable to trade misinvoicing (over-invoicing and under-invoicing) and profit shifting. The country pilots show that trade-related illicit financial flows may vary between 5 to 30% of official goods trade value, and high risks related to the trade of raw minerals, like gold, manganese, copper and uranium. Some countries revealed significant under-invoicing for certain critical minerals, such as copper or cobalt and in others, the financing loss due to illicit financial flows equals twice their education budget, or five times what they spend on health2.

In Namibia, early estimates of illicit financial flows from trade misinvoicing indicate a level of more than 8% of GDP in 2022, with high risks emerging from trade of copper, uranium and other high-value exports. Zambia’s analysis flagged discrepancies in copper and cobalt exports, pointing to potential revenue losses.

Illicit financial flows in critical mineral trade risk undermining development gains.

These findings underscore a critical dimension of mineral governance: illicit financial flows can undermine the very development gains that critical minerals are meant to support. As countries seek to leverage their mineral wealth for structural transformation, energy transition and industrial upgrading, illicit financial flows from trade misinvoicing and profit shifting, pose a direct threat to revenue mobilization and value retention. Addressing these risks requires robust, disaggregated and timely data to identify risks and target action as well as an enabling political environment. Data enables governments to detect vulnerabilities and design targeted interventions on high-risk areas, such as particular sources of illicit financial flows, their destinations, types and channels.

Preventing, detecting and combating criminal activities related to critical minerals is crucial, including to limit organized crime and corruption, illicit financial flows, illegal mining and conflicts of interest which can lead to lost resources, environmental damage, fuel political instability and create social unrest. The UN Panel on Critical Energy Transition Minerals recommended launching “a multi-stakeholder expert process to develop a global traceability, transparency and accountability framework along the entire mineral value chain – from mining to recycling” -—
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. Strengthening inter-agency coordination, adopting global reporting standards and institutionalizing regular assessments of illicit financial flows can help ensure that critical minerals truly contribute to sustainable and inclusive development.

How critical are these minerals for different countries and regions?

A mineral’s criticality depends on regional and national context—spanning supply security, market leverage and untapped potential.

It is possible to analyse how critical minerals are for certain countries or regions using a criteria-based approach. This can be done by analysing : (1) supply risk, captured through an import concentration index, which reflects dependency on a limited number of suppliers; (2) trade opportunity or market dominance, assessed via export concentration, indicating a region’s potential leverage or vulnerability in global markets; and (3) strategic positioning, measured through Revealed Comparative Advantage3 to identify minerals where a region holds a relative trade strength. For example, a mineral with high supply risk in Europe may be a trade opportunity for Africa, or vice versa (see table 1).

Table 1. Highly critical minerals in Europe are often less critical for Africa and vice versa Table 1. Highly critical minerals in Europe are often less critical for Africa and vice versa
Low, medium and highly critical minerals for Africa and Europe
MineralsCriticality status
AfricaEurope
AluminiumLowModerate
BentoniteHighLow
CopperLowHigh
DiatomiteLowModerate
FluorsparLowHigh
GarnetLowHigh
GoldLowModerate
GraphiteModerateHigh
GypsumLowHigh
KaolinHighLow
NickelLowModerate
PerliteLowHigh
PhosphatesLowHigh
SiliconHighModerate
SodiumLowModerate
StrontiumHighModerate
ZincLowModerate

Source: UNCTAD calculations based on UN Comtrade Database -—
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Note: Only minerals with divergent criticality classifications between Africa and Europe are shown. Minerals with identical status in both regions are excluded.

For instance, copper and phosphates are of low criticality in Africa due to abundant reserves and production capacity, yet they are highly critical in Europe, where supply is constrained. Conversely, kaolin is highly critical in Africa, while Europe maintains a more stable supply. Countries such as Nigeria, Ghana and South Africa hold significant kaolin deposits, often underutilized, but with strong potential for industrial development -—
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Minerals like graphite and nickel show moderate to high criticality across Africa and Europe, underscoring their growing importance in energy transitions. Notably, aluminium is marked as low in Africa due to bauxite abundance, but this overlooks the continent’s limited refining infrastructure, which constrains value addition, suggesting a potentially higher strategic relevance. Finally, it is important to assess the role of critical minerals in a flexible and context-specific way to correctly inform policy and investment strategies also in developing regions.

Global supply of critical minerals increasingly dependent on fewer exporters

In 2023, exports of cobalt, chromium, thallium and lithium were the most concentrated globally.

Between 2019 and 2023, the export concentration index reveals a sharp rise for minerals such as cobalt, chromium, lithium and graphite, suggesting that global supply has become increasingly dependent on fewer exporters. This trend is particularly noticeable for graphite and lithium, which are essential for energy storage and battery technologies. Conversely, minerals like perlite, cerium and zirconium have seen a decline in concentration, indicating a more diversified and potentially resilient supply landscape.

Figure 9. Battery minerals like lithium and cobalt faced rising supply chain concentration Figure 9. Battery minerals like lithium and cobalt faced rising supply chain concentration
Export market concentration index, 2019 and 2023

Source: UNCTAD calculations based on UN Comtrade Database -—
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Note: The concentration index of exports ranges from zero to one, with a larger value indicating a higher concentration in the export market. For example, a value of HHI equal to zero indicates that all countries in the world export an equal share of product i, while a value of one means that a single country is responsible for all exports of product i. This index measures, for each product, the degree of export market concentration by country of destination. It tells us if a large share of commodity exports is bought by a small number of countries or, on the contrary, if the exports are well distributed among many countries -—
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. The evolution of the index through time can also give important indications about the changing pattern of a product’s consumption.

Based on production and market concentration (figure 10), the most strategically vulnerable minerals—those in the top-right quadrant—include cobalt, beryllium, graphite and magnesium. Those are characterized by high concentration, and thus a heavy reliance on a small number of countries for both supply and demand. In contrast, minerals like copper, gold, sulphur and tin (the bottom-left quadrant) are widely produced and traded, suggesting a more stable and competitive market environment.

Minerals in the upper-left quadrant are produced by a few countries but exported to a wide range of markets. Producers such as Australia and Brazil for iron ore, China for aluminium, and Brazil and China for gallium, germanium, indium, niobium, tantalum and vanadium have a strategic opportunity to expand processing capacity, deepen industrial linkages, and strengthen their role in global supply chains. As countries accelerate the shift to low-carbon technologies and digital infrastructure, ensuring resilient and diversified mineral supply chains becomes increasingly critical.

Figure 10. Market and production concentration increases risks in global supply of minerals Figure 10. Market and production concentration increases risks in global supply of minerals
Production concentration index, export market concentration index, and global export values in billions of dollars, averages for 2019-2023

Source: UNCTAD calculations based on UN Comtrade, UNCTADstat and World Mining Data -—
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Note: The x-axis shows the export market concentration index, and the y-axis shows the production concentration index, both measured using the normalized Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), ranging from 0 (diversified) to 1 (highly concentrated). Values above 0.25 indicate high concentration -—
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. Bubble size represents the global export value of each mineral in billions of dollars, highlighting its economic weight. All values (indices and export values) are calculated as averages for the period 2019–2023. The production data for minerals is not directly comparable with the UNCTAD list of critical minerals due to differences in classification systems between production statistics and trade data. While trade data is categorized using HS codes, production data is based on mineral outputs that are not always mapped one-to-one with HS-coded traded products. Although efforts were made to align the two datasets, discrepancies remain, as some minerals reported in production statistics may not correspond exactly to those captured in trade flows. Therefore, caution is needed when interpreting which minerals are produced and traded, and when comparing both series.

Mapping of classifications and lists for assessing critical minerals

UNCTAD has developed a comprehensive list of raw and semi-processed critical minerals by mapping and analysing the classification approaches used by leading international and regional institutions, as well as reviewing national and regional assessments. The mapping includes the IEA’s demand-driven approach focused on clean energy technologies, the EU’s broad industrial and sustainability-oriented framework, the USGS’s national security lens, and the WTO-ADB’s trade-based classification. It also incorporates insights from the OECD’s governance and trade monitoring tools, the World Bank’s demand trajectory analysis, ESCWA’s development-focused regional perspective, as well as the AU’s agenda for structural transformation and climate resilience. By comparing how different institutions define and classify critical minerals, UNCTAD identifies areas of convergence and divergence. This makes it easier to see which minerals are consistently considered critical and which are particularly important for structural transformation in developing economies. The comparison also lays the groundwork for a more consistent basis for monitoring trade and production, while keeping development priorities at the centre.

Table 2. Mapping of institutional approaches to critical minerals Table 2. Mapping of institutional approaches to critical minerals
OrganizationDefinition / ApproachKey CriteriaList StatusFocus AreaDistinctive Features
AUDevelopment-focused approach to leverage mineral wealth for local industrialization and climate resilience.Resource endowment, job creation, value chain localization, sustainabilityEmerging list (prioritizes cobalt, lithium, graphite, rare earths)African mineral-producing economies, just energy transitionEmphasizes local beneficiation, inclusive development and environmental safeguards. Aligns with AU Agenda 2063 and the SDGs, prioritizing minerals critical to Africa’s climate resilience and industrialization.
ESCWARegional framework linking mineral use to development opportunities and industrial capacity.Local value addition, institutional capacity, energy transition roleRegional list (14 minerals)Arab countries' industrial development and energy transitionReframes criticality around strategic potential. Prioritizes domestic processing, job creation and equity in mineral value chains.
EUBased on economic importance and supply risk. Extended by foresight on strategic technologies under the Green Deal.Industrial demand, supply disruption risks, strategic autonomyFixed list (34 raw materials, 2023 CRM update)Clean energy, green and digital transitions, strategic industriesApplies multi-sectoral lens. Integrates future demand projections and sustainability factors, including environmental and social dimensions
IEADemand-driven methodology with no fixed list. Minerals are assessed based on their relevance to energy transition technologies.Supply risk and economic importance to clean energy systemsDynamic (26 core minerals analysed regularly)Clean energy technologies (solar, wind, EVs, etc.)Classifies minerals along a continuum of criticality. Uses tools like the Critical Minerals Data Explorer to assess 37 minerals under multiple scenarios.
OECDNo formal list or definition. Provides governance tools and transparency indicators.Export restrictions, policy risk, supply chain governanceNot applicableTrade regulation, responsible sourcing, global risk exposureTracks export restrictions on 65 raw materials. Offers Due Diligence Guidance on conflict minerals. Focuses on long-term structural risks and supply governance.
USGSLegal definition from the U.S. Energy Act of 2020. Assessment based on strategic importance and vulnerability to disruption.Supply risk, economic importance, U.S. import relianceFixed list (50 critical minerals, reviewed periodically)Economic security, defense, energy and high-tech sectorsCombines quantitative indicators (e.g., production share, import dependence) with expert judgement. Excludes widely available commodities like copper and aluminium.
World BankDemand-driven framework based on projected mineral intensity across clean energy technologies.Projected demand growth, cross-technology relevanceNo list; 4 categories based on expected impactMineral needs for solar, wind, storage, etc.Classifies minerals by sectoral importance: high-impact, medium-impact, cross-cutting. Focuses on forward-looking demand under climate scenarios.
WTOADBTrade-based mapping of mineral-related products using existing national and international lists.Trade exposure and value chain positioningNo harmonized list; about 250 HS-coded products (raw, intermediate, finished)Global trade in energy transition materialsFocuses on trade flows and product stages, not criticality per se. Valuable for understanding supply chain stages and export composition.

Sources: UNCTAD mapping based on -—
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Bringing a developing economy perspective to critical minerals

Emerging academic research emphasizes that mineral criticality is context-dependent, shaped by national priorities, capacities and development goals rather than being an inherent or fixed property. Most existing frameworks reflect the perspectives of high-income importing countries, focusing on supply risks and economic importance -—
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. In contrast, mineral-exporting developing economies, such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo (cobalt), Indonesia (nickel), Chile (copper and lithium), and Brazil (niobium and REEs), tend to prioritize domestic industrial development, environmental governance and trade leverage.

For instance, Indonesia restricts exports of unprocessed nickel to boost local processing and manufacturing, while Chile is developing public-private partnerships to manage its lithium industry more effectively. These cases highlight the need for frameworks that consider a country’s ability to move up the value chain, through processing or advanced manufacturing, and its institutional capacity to compete in global markets.

Critical minerals must be defined by development priorities—not just global demand—to empower resource-rich economies to capture value, build industries and achieve equitable growth.

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propose a dynamic framework that integrates global supply-demand factors with national capacities in extraction, processing and governance. Rather than relying on a fixed mineral list, they prioritize minerals central to the green transition—such as lithium, cobalt and REEs—allowing for flexible classification informed by country-specific contexts which could also be more suited for emerging and resource-rich economies. These frameworks advocate aligning mineral policy not only with supply security and international demand but also with national priorities.

The Africa Green Minerals Strategy underscores the importance of using mineral resources to drive domestic value addition, job creation and regional industrialization, moving beyond Africa’s traditional role as a raw material exporter -—
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highlights the importance of clear rules, fair local processing and stronger negotiation skills to make sure that benefits of mining reach people and support long-term development.

UNCTAD assessed national and regional strategies related to minerals and their economic role. This revealed a diversity of terminology, including critical minerals, strategic minerals, green minerals and critical raw minerals, depending on context (see table 3).

Table 3. Terminology related to critical minerals differs based on context, country and purpose Table 3. Terminology related to critical minerals differs based on context, country and purpose
LabelingCountries-Regions
Critical mineralsArgentina, Indonesia, South Africa, Australia, Canada, United Kingdom, United States of America
Critical raw materialsEuropean Union
Green mineralsAfrican Union
Industrial minerals
Minerals of strategic economic importance
Argentina
Strategic MineralsArgentina, Brazil, China, Colombia, India, Indonesia

Source: UNCTAD mapping based on Ministerio de Economía, Argentina -—
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Countries define and communicate about critical minerals differently, with some publishing strategies (e.g., EU or the United Kingdom) or acts (e.g., Argentina and Brazil), and others offering preliminary assessments (e.g., Colombia and Indonesia). An analysis of 13 countries and regions reveals eight factors for assessing how critical a mineral is for: the economy, energy transition, industry, infrastructure, international trade, security, supply chains and technology, and these can be disaggregated further into their sub-factors (see annex 3.).

Developing economies’ assessments of critical minerals are more varied, often focusing on inputs for domestic industries and national security. Supply risk is the most cited criterion overall, mentioned by eight of thirteen countries or regions, universally by developed economies, but only by one-third of developing ones. Developing economies also highlight criteria such as food security, defense, industrial development, employment and comparative advantage. They place particular emphasis on the role of minerals in generating government revenue and foreign exchange.

In contrast, developed economies uniquely emphasize maintaining supply chains, international trade and economic stability. They also consider alternative sourcing, recycling and substitution options. Only half of the countries explicitly reference the energy transition, digital economy or technology in their definitions, though most strategies are implicitly linked to these goals.

A more inclusive understanding of critical minerals can reflect diverse economic structures, such as the importance of agriculture and food security, and account for mineral endowments, market concentration and fiscal dependence, especially in resource-rich developing countries.

While there is overlap in mineral lists, developing economies often include gold and iron ore, excluded from most developed country lists due to their large, liquid markets. Their inclusion reflects their fiscal and developmental importance in the global South.

What is critical today might not be tomorrow

UNCTAD’s classification of critical minerals aims to be dynamic. Minerals like lithium and cobalt have become essential due to their role in battery production, with demand expected to rise sharply by 2040 -—
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, are gaining attention for emerging technologies. Meanwhile, advances in recycling, substitution and efficiency can reduce reliance on primary materials, reshaping which minerals are considered critical. As these factors evolve, so must the frameworks used to define criticality.

Geopolitical shifts, trade tensions and supply disruptions also influence mineral criticality. This calls for adaptable strategies in resource management and international cooperation. Minerals represent both risks and opportunities, for industrialization, green growth and trade diversification.

However, several challenges limit countries’ ability to assess and benefit from their mineral resources. A key issue is the lack of specific trade data for informed policy action. HS codes often group minerals into broad categories, and this is compounded by missing or inconsistent trade data. These gaps hinder efforts to monitor trade, assess risks and design effective policies. As critical minerals gain importance, improving detailed trade data by means of capacity building becomes more urgent.

Critical minerals are dynamicUNCTAD’s framework considers technological shifts, market changes and development priorities.

Future work could further explore the priorities of developing economies, incorporating broader criteria aligned with their development needs. This includes integrating environmental and social dimensions, such as recycling potential, responsible sourcing and early circular economy practices. In addition, the list of critical minerals should remain adaptable to reflect emerging technologies, sectoral shifts and evolving development goals. Improving the granularity of trade classifications, particularly through engagement with the World Customs Organization on HS code revisions, is essential to better capture mineral processing stages and product differentiation. This would enable expanding analysis to finished goods and enhancing trade data quality through cooperation with customs and national statistical offices. Country case studies could help to deepen the understanding of value creation. In the future, UNCTAD’s could integrate greenfield and firm-level investment data as a complementary source for information on production alongside trade data.

Finally, the UNCTAD16 intergovernmental meeting offers a platform for member States to discuss evolving priorities and provide input on analytical needs based on national goals and technological trends. UNCTAD’s current list of critical-strategic minerals is a starting point. It is designed to evolve, guided by a multidimensional approach that reflects global relevance and development needs, especially for energy, digital and industrial transitions.

Annexes

Annex 1. UNCTAD’s approach to identifying critical minerals

To develop a comprehensive and inclusive list of critical minerals relevant to global energy transition and industrial needs and tailored to reflect the priorities of both developing and developed economies, UNCTAD undertook a systematic, multi-step exercise. The process was designed to be transparent, data-driven and grounded in expert input. The list was built from the ground up, starting with national and regional priorities, refined through expert consultations, and validated using trade data. A key innovation is the systematic mapping of each mineral to HS codes, enabling robust trade analysis and policy relevance. The methodology involved reviewing national and institutional critical mineral lists, assessing country strategies, and refining selections through expert feedback and trade indicators. The final output, a harmonized list of 60 critical minerals, mapped by 499 HS codes, supports trade policy analysis while accounting for global development priorities. Below is an overview of the key steps in UNCTAD’s methodology.

Step 1: Review of country, regional and institutional critical mineral lists

UNCTAD compiled critical mineral lists from national, regional and international sources, including Argentina, Brazil, Canada, China, India, Japan and the United States; regional bodies like the African Union and European Union; and international organizations including the IEA, OECD, IRENA, WTO-ADB, World Bank and ESCWA.

Step 2: Assessment of country strategies and criteria for critical minerals

UNCTAD carried out an assessment of countries’ strategies and criteria for identifying critical minerals. This provided a validation to the selection of minerals to be included on UNCTAD’s comprehensive list, intended to ensure inclusive consideration of minerals that are critical for both developed and developing economies. The review assessed a sample of strategic documents and how they approached critical minerals, including in African Union, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, European Union, India, Indonesia, South Africa, United Kingdom and the United States of America.

Step 3. Selection of a list of critical minerals

UNCTAD developed a reference list of 85 critical raw and semi-processed materials based on mapped classifications and country-level strategic priorities. The selection reflects the needs of both developing and developed economies, with a focus on clean energy, digitalization and industrial growth. Expert judgment, trade exposure and targeted data were used. The list adopts an inclusive approach but includes instances of double counting, such as listing REEs as a group alongside individual elements (e.g., dysprosium, neodymium), and similarly for PMG.

Step 4: HS code identification using HS 2022

Each mineral was matched to appropriate 6-digit HS codes based on traded forms (e.g., ores, refined metals). Care was taken to avoid misclassification, especially for mixed-use products. Some materials were grouped due to classification challenges, resulting in a final list of 60 critical minerals, covering raw and semi-processed minerals. Special attention was paid to distinguishing between pure substances and downstream or mixed-use products.

Step 5. Backward correspondence across HS revisions

To enable historical trade analysis, HS 2022 codes were mapped to earlier versions (HS 2017, 2012, 2007, 2002) using official tables and expert input. This ensured consistency across countries and time periods.

Step 6. Trade data integration and validation

Mapped HS codes were used to extract trade data from UN Comtrade. Volumes and values were validated through cross-checks, producing a consistent dataset for analyzing trade flows and dependencies.

Step 7. Grouping minerals by energy transition relevance

Minerals were categorized into three groups:

  • Required for the energy transition (27)
  • Relevant to the energy transition (10)
  • Other critical minerals (23)

This classification integrates global frameworks (e.g., IEA, World Bank) and regional priorities (e.g., ESCWA), including UNCTAD expertise. The grouping supports targeted analysis of materials essential to green technologies like electric vehicles, solar panels and hydrogen systems.

Step 8. Classifying minerals by criticality status

After compiling the relevant trade data, we calculated indicators based on HS codes. We ultimately focused on two key indicators:

  1. Revealed Comparative Advantage
  2. Trade Concentration Index (for both exports and imports)

Using these indicators, the scores for each mineral across different regions were generated. Based on these scores, minerals have been categorized into three levels of criticality: High, Moderate and Low. Additional indicators, such as dependency ratios, can be considered to further refine the assessment.

Annex 2. Full UNCTAD list (mapped to HS Codes)

Figure 11. Mapping UNCTAD’s list of critical minerals Figure 11. Mapping UNCTAD’s list of critical minerals
Hierarchical breakdown of 6-digit HS 2022 codes for UNCTAD-listed critical minerals

Note: The complete UNCTAD's HS code classification for critical minerals, including revisions from 2002 to 2022, is available for download.

Annex 3. Comparative overview of national and regional approaches to Critical Minerals assessment

Table 4. Eight factors of national and regional critical mineral assessments Table 4. Eight factors of national and regional critical mineral assessments
Policy ThemeSub-Category (Factor)Developed CountriesDeveloping Countries
A. EconomyConsumptionEuropean Union, United KingdomColombia
Digital EconomyCanadaSouth Africa
EmploymentArgentina, Colombia
ImportanceAustraliaIndia, Indonesia
Resource availabilityCanadaColombia, India, Indonesia
Value additionEuropean Union, United KingdomArgentina, Indonesia
B. Energy TransitionInputsCanadaAfrican Union, Colombia, South Africa
C. IndustryAvailability of processing technologyIndonesia
DevelopmentAfrican Union, Argentina, China
InputsUnited States of AmericaAfrican Union, Argentina, Brazil, Indonesia
D. InfrastructureDevelopmentColombia
E. International TradeComparative advantageArgentina, Brazil
Demand of industrialized countriesArgentina
Government revenue generationArgentina, Indonesia
Import substitutionArgentina
Increase foreign exchange reservesArgentina, Indonesia
Market controlIndonesia
Positioning as strategic partnerCanada
Reliance on importsEuropean Union, United KingdomArgentina, India
Surplus in trade balanceBrazil
F. SecurityDefenseChina, India, Indonesia
Economic securityCanada, USAChina
Food SecurityArgentina, Colombia, India
National securityAustralia, Canada, USA
G. Supply ChainsAlternative sourcingUnited Kingdom
Availability of SubstitutesEuropean Union
Concentration of sourcingEuropean Union, United Kingdom
Lack of substitutesArgentina, Indonesia
RecyclingEuropean Union, United Kingdom
Supply riskAustralia, Canada, European Union, United Kingdom, USAArgentina, India, Indonesia
H. TechnologyInputsAustraliaBrazil, Indonesia

Source: UNCTAD mapping based on Ministerio de Economía, Argentina -—
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Note: The strategies of Colombia and Indonesia are preliminary. All labels are included in this table.

Notes

  1. Although the term ‘minerals’ is used throughout for simplicity, the analysis covers both minerals and metals. For instance, it refers to minerals that are economically important and face a high risk of supply disruption. Many of these minerals are sources of critical metals, for example, lithium, cobalt, nickel and REEs are all classified as critical minerals, and they yield metals that are essential for clean energy technologies, electronics and defense applications. So, while not all metals are considered critical, many critical minerals do produce or contain metals, and the terms are often used together in this strategic context.
  2. The estimate refers to total IFFs from all sources, not just those related to trade in critical minerals. These flows include tax evasion, corruption and other illicit activities that drain public resources and undermine development -—
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  3. See, for example, -—
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    for foundational work on revealed comparative advantage.

References

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