Rethinking the role of critical minerals for development

The global shift toward a low-carbon economy has intensified the demand for critical minerals, placing resource-rich developing countries at the centre of a new geopolitical and economic landscape. In this context, UNCTAD plays a role from the development perspective by promoting fair, inclusive and sustainable trade in critical minerals. UNCTAD also co-led the Secretariat of the United Nations Secretary-General’s Panel on Critical Energy Transition Minerals -—
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—-, which focused on how to guide critical energy transition minerals towards equity and justice.

The UN Panel defines critical energy transition minerals as minerals necessary to construct, produce, distribute and store renewable energy, including copper, cobalt, nickel, lithium, graphite, REEs and aluminum required for electric vehicles and battery storage; and silicon, cadmium, tellurium and selenium (among others) that build solar panels. Wind and hydropower, for instance, require copper and chromium, zinc and aluminium -—
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At COP29, UNCTAD outlined four strategic priorities to address a $225 billion investment gap in mining projects across developing economies: investment in infrastructure, fairer trade rules, transparent governance and knowledge sharing -—
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—-, aligning with the UN Panel’s principles on equitable benefit-sharing.

At the international investment policy level, a number of recent IIAs include specific provisions facilitating and promoting investment in energy and raw materials. These provisions aim to improve the investment environment and remove ground-level obstacles for investors’ activities. Certain recent IIAs for instance provide for the transparency and simplification of procedures for investment in raw materials (see e.g. the European Union-New Zealand FTA -—
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—-). When aligned with countries’ national critical minerals strategies, IIAs can support industrial and investment policy objectives for strategic mineral resources. At the same time, IIAs composed of thousands of agreements may limit space to regulate critical minerals’ extraction and exploitation and raise the risk of costly investor-state disputes. For example, at least five cases in 2024 involved the mining of critical minerals, such as copper -—
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—-, lithium -—
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—-, titanium potentially contained in heavy mineral sands deposits -—
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This SDG Pulse In-Focus provides data-driven analysis of trade and production of critical minerals and proposes UNCTAD’s list of critical minerals. This work builds on the UN Panel’s definition adding to it a review of minerals strategic for developing economies, mapping existing classifications of critical minerals, and offering statistical analysis of what makes minerals critical for both developed and developing economies.

Toward a comprehensive list of critical minerals for trade and development

UNCTAD considers minerals¹ critical not only by their global importance and supply risks but by their relevance for trade and development, reflecting the priorities of developing economies. A mineral is considered critical if it supports structural transformation, energy and digital transitions, or industrial upgrading, while it might also pose supply risks, or offer trade opportunities.

This list of 60 critical minerals mapped to 499 harmonized system (HS) codes can inform the analysis of global trade in minerals and support SDG-aligned national strategies. The data enables analysis of trade dependence, export restrictions, production concentration and value-added potential. While the current list focuses on raw and semi-processed minerals and metals, it could be further expanded in the future to enable the analysis of processed critical minerals and their role in circular economy and global value chains (see the full list in annex 2.). All subsequent analysis draws on this UNCTAD list and its categorization.

Figure 1. UNCTAD’s list of critical minerals by role in energy transition and other areas

As part of this approach, minerals were grouped by their relevance to the energy transition into three categories: those required for the transition (27) (e.g., cobalt, copper, lithium, REEs), relevant to it (10) (e.g., iron ore and steel, palladium, zirconium), and other critical minerals (23) (e.g., gold, gypsum, lead, silver). This distinction helps highlight which materials are under increasing geopolitical and economic scrutiny due to their strategic importance in clean energy technologies. Indeed, this supports targeted analysis of materials essential to technologies like electric vehicles, solar panels and hydrogen systems. Critical status was then assessed using two key indicators, Revealed Comparative Advantage and Trade Concentration Index (for both exports and imports), to classify minerals into high, moderate, or low criticality. See annex 1. for the full list of methodological steps.

Trade in critical minerals reached $2.5 trillion in 2023, with Asia emerging as the world’s largest importing market

In 2023, global trade in raw and semi-processed minerals reached approximately $2.57 trillion in imports and $2.52 trillion in exports. This trade segment represented over 10% of total global exports, highlighting its critical role in the international economy.

Regionally, Asia emerged as the largest market for critical minerals, accounting for $1.5 trillion in imports, more than half of the global total—while exporting only $825 billion, with China accounting for roughly 40 per cent of imports in the Asia region. This substantial trade deficit of around $680 billion underscores Asia's role as the primary global hub for processing and manufacturing activities that relies heavily on critical mineral inputs.

In contrast, Africa, the Americas and Oceania recorded significant trade surpluses, indicating their dominant roles as suppliers of critical minerals. Africa exported nearly $266 billion reflecting a share of 10.6% of world trade, while importing only $68 billion, and Oceania, despite relatively low import volumes, exported over $239 billion. The Americas also showed strong export performance, with a surplus of nearly $194 billion. Europe maintained a more balanced trade profile, with exports slightly exceeding imports. These patterns highlight the global supply chain structure, where mineral-rich regions provide essential inputs for the energy transition, while industrialized and manufacturing-heavy regions, particularly Asia, drive demand. These trade patterns also reflect underlying investment trends in extraction and processing, which shape the geography of mineral value chains.

Figure 2. Asia imports over half the world’s critical minerals, while Africa and Oceania emerge as critical mineral suppliers

Total value exports and imports of raw and semi-processed critical minerals, by region, in billions of dollars, 2005-2023

Source: UNCTAD calculations based on UN Comtrade Database -—
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Minerals required for energy transition drive $773 billion in exports – one third of the total exports of critical minerals

In 2023, global exports of critical minerals required for energy transition amounted to $773 billion (31% of global exports of critical minerals), $674 billion (27%) for minerals relevant to energy transition, and $1,078 billion (43%) for all other critical minerals.

Critical mineral exports grew significantly from 2005 to 2023 across all regions, with Asia and Europe leading in total values. Asia shows the most significant and sustained increase, driven largely by exports of other critical minerals and those relevant to energy transition. The Americas display fluctuating trends among the three segments of critical minerals, with strong overall growth, while Africa records steady growth with a gradual rise in energy-transition-related minerals. Oceania, though starting from a lower base, shows consistent increased and a balanced export mix. Overall, the data reflects increasing global supply for critical minerals, especially for clean energy minerals, such as cobalt, copper, lithium, nickel and REEs.

Figure 3. Exports of energy transition minerals increased until 2022, most in Asia and Europe

Regional exports of raw and semi-processed critical minerals in value, by category of energy-transition-related minerals, in billions of dollars

Source: UNCTAD calculations based on UN Comtrade Database -—
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Data show deep bilateral dependencies in critical minerals’ trade

In 2023, global trade in critical minerals revealed deep bilateral dependencies. Australia emerged as the top exporter by trade value, with over $231 billion in critical mineral exports, primarily to China, Japan and India. Other major exporters included the United States and China. Notable trade corridors included Australia–China ($95 billion), Hong Kong–China ($43 billion) and Canada–United States ($41 billion). Several bilateral flows exceeded $10 billion, including those between the Democratic Republic of Congo and China, the United Arab Emirates and India, and Brazil and China, underscoring Asia’s central role as a demand hub. These patterns highlight the strategic concentration of mineral supply chains.

Battery and electric vehicle manufacturing affect the top traded minerals globally

Copper, aluminium and nickel are the top traded critical minerals essential for energy transition, together with other energy-relevant minerals, such as iron ore and steel, sulphur and potassium.

Africa emerged as the breakout performer in copper, nearly doubling exports (+98.2% to $44 billion) to meet surging demand for electrical infrastructure and electric vehicles. The continent also led nickel growth with a remarkable 122.8% surge, while Asia's nickel exports more than doubled (+107.5% to $15 billion), fuelled by battery manufacturing needs.

Iron ore maintained its position as an important industrial mineral, with Asia's exports growing 52.8% to $192 billion – underscoring ongoing steel demand. Oceania's iron ore shipments grew steadily (+33.7% to $94 billion), although outpaced by its metallurgical coal expansion.

Energy transition needs are significantly reshaping trade flows of critical minerals as reflected by the top 10 globally exported minerals, with regions rich in critical metals gaining strategic economic leverage.

Figure 4. Exports of minerals needed for energy and digital transitions significantly up from 2019

Top 10 globally exported minerals by region, in billions of dollars, 2019 and 2023

Source: UNCTAD calculations based on UN Comtrade Database -—
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Note: The top 10 exported minerals were identified based on total global export values in 2019-2023.
Gold exports from Europe largely reflect refined gold and may include significant volumes of re-exports and re-imports.

Top mineral producers aren’t always the top exporters

Data reveal striking patterns of concentration in the production of critical minerals: China leads in aluminium and REEs, while the Democratic Republic of Congo dominates cobalt. Australia is the top producer of lithium, and Chile remains the foremost copper producer. However, production statistics are not mapped to HS codes, which are used in trade reporting. This disconnect makes it difficult to directly compare raw production with export volumes. Complementary investment data - particularly from project- and firm-level databases - can help fill this gap by identifying where production and processing facilities are being established by multinational firms -—
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—-. Still, a compelling narrative emerges; for instance, China, while being the top producer of several minerals, is not always the top exporter. This suggests high domestic consumption or value-added processing, where raw materials are transformed into intermediate or final products before being exported. Similarly, South Africa, which accounts for over 80% of global platinum and other PMG production, exports less raw material than expected, as much of it is refined domestically before entering global markets. These dynamics underscore the importance of looking beyond extraction to understand the full picture of mineral flows and economic strategy and of developing a full list that identifies final goods that depend on critical minerals.

Figure 5. Explore the top 5 mineral producers, by mineral

Mineral production for top five producers (2021-2023 average) and the Rest of the World, share

Select a mineral:

Aluminium Antimony Arsenic Barite Bauxite Bentonite Beryllium Bismuth Boron Cadmium Chromium Cobalt Copper Diamonds Diatomite Feldspar Fluorspar Gallium, Germanium, Indium, Niobium, Tantalum, and Vanadium Gold Graphite Gypsum Iron ore and steel Kaolin Lead Lithium Magnesium Manganese Mercury Metallurgical Coal Molybdenum Nickel Other PMG Palladium Perlite Phosphates Platinum Potassium Rare-earth elements Rhenium Selenium Silver Sulphur Tin Titanium Tungsten Uranium Zinc Zirconium

Source: UNCTAD calculations based on World Mining Data -—
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Note: The top 5 producing economies were identified based on total production values in 2023. The production data for minerals is not directly comparable with the UNCTAD list of critical minerals due to differences in classification systems between production statistics and trade data. While trade data is categorized using HS codes, production data is based on mineral outputs that are not always mapped one-to-one with HS-coded traded products. Although efforts were made to align the two datasets, discrepancies remain, as some minerals reported in production statistics may not correspond exactly to those captured in trade flows. Therefore, caution is needed when interpreting which minerals are produced and traded, and when comparing both series.

Trade in critical minerals highly regionally specialized

Figure 6 shows that Africa emerges as a dominant net exporter of critical minerals such as cobalt, manganese and platinum, reflecting its rich geological endowment and growing role in global supply chains. However, it remains reliant on imports for minerals like boron and arsenic (the latter being important for gold processing), largely due to limited domestic production capacity. Oceania, particularly Australia, plays a pivotal role as a global supplier of iron ore, nickel and zinc, yet depends on external sources for potassium and fluorspar. Asia, driven by its vast industrial base, mainly in China, faces substantial trade deficits in cobalt, manganese and chromium, although it maintains a competitive edge in the export of REEs and graphite. Europe presents a mixed profile: while it shows net surpluses in refined gold, palladium and other PMG, these are primarily the result of its advanced refining infrastructure (especially for gold) rather than raw material extraction. At the same time, Europe remains a net importer of manganese, zirconium and graphite. The Americas maintain a relatively balanced trade position, with strong exports of lithium, copper and zinc, but continue to import chromium and manganese to meet industrial demand.

Figure 6. Trade surpluses and deficits across regions underscore global interdependence in critical mineral supply

(Normalized net trade in minerals balance, by continent, 2023)

Source: UNCTAD calculations based on UN Comtrade Database -—
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Note: Net mineral trade balance values is calculated according to the following formula: (X_{ji} - M_{ji})/(X_{ji} + M_{ji}) where i refers to specific Mineral (or its commodity composition), j … economy (or group of economies), X_{ji} … economy’s j exports of specific mineral commodity/mineral category i to World M_{ji} … economy’s j imports of specific mineral commodity/mineral commodity category i from World. Net mineral trade balance values range between -1 and 1. The positive value indicates that an economy has net exports or surplus. The negative values mean a deficit, indicating that the economy imports more than it exports.

Export restrictions shape critical minerals’ trade

Export restrictions can generate supply uncertainties and influence global prices, as well as investment decisions. The data show a clear pattern: minerals required for energy transition—such as copper, zinc, germanium and others, tin and nickel—face a significantly higher and growing number of export restrictions compared to other traded critical minerals. This trend reflects rising geopolitical sensitivities and growing domestic value-chain ambitions in producing countries. In contrast, minerals not directly linked to new energy technologies generally experience fewer trade restrictions. The heatmap below highlights how critical minerals are subjected to export restrictions, which may affect supply security for energy transition worldwide.

Figure 7. Rising restrictions on exports of critical minerals could disrupt energy transition

Total number of export restrictions, by mineral, 2019-2023

Source: UNCTAD calculations based on -—
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Note: Total number of export restrictions corresponds to aggregated policy measures including export taxes, quotas, licensing requirements, export bans, minimum export prices, VAT rebate reductions and other administrative controls -—
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—-. The radiant color indicates the intensity of export restrictions. The number of critical minerals shown in this figure differs from those used in the trade analysis. The database includes only minerals identified as critical raw materials by -—
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—- and for which data is available under HS 6-digit codes (HS07 classification).

When examining critical minerals essential for the energy transition, the highest number of export restrictions between 2019 and 2023 were imposed by countries such as Democratic Republic of Congo, Mongolia, India, Burundi and Zambia. These restrictions primarily target key minerals including copper (notably in Democratic Republic of Congo, Mongolia, Zambia and Argentina), molybdenum (Mongolia), and a group of high-tech or strategic minerals such as gallium, germanium, indium, niobium, tantalum and vanadium (notably in Burundi and Ethiopia). Zinc has also been subject to restrictions, particularly in India, Burundi and Ethiopia.

Figure 8. Countries like Democratic Republic of Congo, Mongolia and India account for most export restrictions on energy-transition minerals

Number of export restrictions by country for critical minerals required for energy transition, average over 2019-2023

Source: UNCTAD calculations based on -—
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Note: This chart displays the average number of export restrictions by country from 2019 to 2023, focusing on countries with the highest levels of restrictions. Each country has its top two most frequently restricted minerals highlighted in distinct colours. All the rest of the minerals are marked in grey. The number of critical minerals shown in this figure differs from those used in the trade analysis. The database includes only minerals identified as critical raw materials by -—
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How critical are these minerals for different countries and regions?

It is possible to analyse how critical minerals are for certain countries or regions using a criteria-based approach. This can be done by analysing : (1) supply risk, captured through an import concentration index, which reflects dependency on a limited number of suppliers; (2) trade opportunity or market dominance, assessed via export concentration, indicating a region’s potential leverage or vulnerability in global markets; and (3) strategic positioning, measured through Revealed Comparative Advantage³ to identify minerals where a region holds a relative trade strength. For example, a mineral with high supply risk in Europe may be a trade opportunity for Africa, or vice versa (see table 1).

Table 1. Highly critical minerals in Europe are often less critical for Africa and vice versa

Low, medium and highly critical minerals for Africa and Europe

Minerals	Criticality status
	Africa	Europe
Aluminium	Low	Moderate
Bentonite	High	Low
Copper	Low	High
Diatomite	Low	Moderate
Fluorspar	Low	High
Garnet	Low	High
Gold	Low	Moderate
Graphite	Moderate	High
Gypsum	Low	High
Kaolin	High	Low
Nickel	Low	Moderate
Perlite	Low	High
Phosphates	Low	High
Silicon	High	Moderate
Sodium	Low	Moderate
Strontium	High	Moderate
Zinc	Low	Moderate

Source: UNCTAD calculations based on UN Comtrade Database -—
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Note: Only minerals with divergent criticality classifications between Africa and Europe are shown. Minerals with identical status in both regions are excluded.

For instance, copper and phosphates are of low criticality in Africa due to abundant reserves and production capacity, yet they are highly critical in Europe, where supply is constrained. Conversely, kaolin is highly critical in Africa, while Europe maintains a more stable supply. Countries such as Nigeria, Ghana and South Africa hold significant kaolin deposits, often underutilized, but with strong potential for industrial development -—
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Minerals like graphite and nickel show moderate to high criticality across Africa and Europe, underscoring their growing importance in energy transitions. Notably, aluminium is marked as low in Africa due to bauxite abundance, but this overlooks the continent’s limited refining infrastructure, which constrains value addition, suggesting a potentially higher strategic relevance. Finally, it is important to assess the role of critical minerals in a flexible and context-specific way to correctly inform policy and investment strategies also in developing regions.

Global supply of critical minerals increasingly dependent on fewer exporters

Between 2019 and 2023, the export concentration index reveals a sharp rise for minerals such as cobalt, chromium, lithium and graphite, suggesting that global supply has become increasingly dependent on fewer exporters. This trend is particularly noticeable for graphite and lithium, which are essential for energy storage and battery technologies. Conversely, minerals like perlite, cerium and zirconium have seen a decline in concentration, indicating a more diversified and potentially resilient supply landscape.

Figure 9. Battery minerals like lithium and cobalt faced rising supply chain concentration

Export market concentration index, 2019 and 2023

Source: UNCTAD calculations based on UN Comtrade Database -—
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Note: The concentration index of exports ranges from zero to one, with a larger value indicating a higher concentration in the export market. For example, a value of HHI equal to zero indicates that all countries in the world export an equal share of product i, while a value of one means that a single country is responsible for all exports of product i. This index measures, for each product, the degree of export market concentration by country of destination. It tells us if a large share of commodity exports is bought by a small number of countries or, on the contrary, if the exports are well distributed among many countries -—
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Based on production and market concentration (figure 10), the most strategically vulnerable minerals—those in the top-right quadrant—include cobalt, beryllium, graphite and magnesium. Those are characterized by high concentration, and thus a heavy reliance on a small number of countries for both supply and demand. In contrast, minerals like copper, gold, sulphur and tin (the bottom-left quadrant) are widely produced and traded, suggesting a more stable and competitive market environment.

Minerals in the upper-left quadrant are produced by a few countries but exported to a wide range of markets. Producers such as Australia and Brazil for iron ore, China for aluminium, and Brazil and China for gallium, germanium, indium, niobium, tantalum and vanadium have a strategic opportunity to expand processing capacity, deepen industrial linkages, and strengthen their role in global supply chains. As countries accelerate the shift to low-carbon technologies and digital infrastructure, ensuring resilient and diversified mineral supply chains becomes increasingly critical.

Figure 10. Market and production concentration increases risks in global supply of minerals

Production concentration index, export market concentration index, and global export values in billions of dollars, averages for 2019-2023

Source: UNCTAD calculations based on UN Comtrade, UNCTADstat and World Mining Data -—
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Note: The x-axis shows the export market concentration index, and the y-axis shows the production concentration index, both measured using the normalized Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), ranging from 0 (diversified) to 1 (highly concentrated). Values above 0.25 indicate high concentration -—
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—-. Bubble size represents the global export value of each mineral in billions of dollars, highlighting its economic weight. All values (indices and export values) are calculated as averages for the period 2019–2023. The production data for minerals is not directly comparable with the UNCTAD list of critical minerals due to differences in classification systems between production statistics and trade data. While trade data is categorized using HS codes, production data is based on mineral outputs that are not always mapped one-to-one with HS-coded traded products. Although efforts were made to align the two datasets, discrepancies remain, as some minerals reported in production statistics may not correspond exactly to those captured in trade flows. Therefore, caution is needed when interpreting which minerals are produced and traded, and when comparing both series.

Mapping of classifications and lists for assessing critical minerals

UNCTAD has developed a comprehensive list of raw and semi-processed critical minerals by mapping and analysing the classification approaches used by leading international and regional institutions, as well as reviewing national and regional assessments. The mapping includes the IEA’s demand-driven approach focused on clean energy technologies, the EU’s broad industrial and sustainability-oriented framework, the USGS’s national security lens, and the WTO-ADB’s trade-based classification. It also incorporates insights from the OECD’s governance and trade monitoring tools, the World Bank’s demand trajectory analysis, ESCWA’s development-focused regional perspective, as well as the AU’s agenda for structural transformation and climate resilience. By comparing how different institutions define and classify critical minerals, UNCTAD identifies areas of convergence and divergence. This makes it easier to see which minerals are consistently considered critical and which are particularly important for structural transformation in developing economies. The comparison also lays the groundwork for a more consistent basis for monitoring trade and production, while keeping development priorities at the centre.

Table 2. Mapping of institutional approaches to critical minerals

Organization	Definition / Approach	Key Criteria	List Status	Focus Area	Distinctive Features
AU	Development-focused approach to leverage mineral wealth for local industrialization and climate resilience.	Resource endowment, job creation, value chain localization, sustainability	Emerging list (prioritizes cobalt, lithium, graphite, rare earths)	African mineral-producing economies, just energy transition	Emphasizes local beneficiation, inclusive development and environmental safeguards. Aligns with AU Agenda 2063 and the SDGs, prioritizing minerals critical to Africa’s climate resilience and industrialization.
ESCWA	Regional framework linking mineral use to development opportunities and industrial capacity.	Local value addition, institutional capacity, energy transition role	Regional list (14 minerals)	Arab countries' industrial development and energy transition	Reframes criticality around strategic potential. Prioritizes domestic processing, job creation and equity in mineral value chains.
EU	Based on economic importance and supply risk. Extended by foresight on strategic technologies under the Green Deal.	Industrial demand, supply disruption risks, strategic autonomy	Fixed list (34 raw materials, 2023 CRM update)	Clean energy, green and digital transitions, strategic industries	Applies multi-sectoral lens. Integrates future demand projections and sustainability factors, including environmental and social dimensions
IEA	Demand-driven methodology with no fixed list. Minerals are assessed based on their relevance to energy transition technologies.	Supply risk and economic importance to clean energy systems	Dynamic (26 core minerals analysed regularly)	Clean energy technologies (solar, wind, EVs, etc.)	Classifies minerals along a continuum of criticality. Uses tools like the Critical Minerals Data Explorer to assess 37 minerals under multiple scenarios.
OECD	No formal list or definition. Provides governance tools and transparency indicators.	Export restrictions, policy risk, supply chain governance	Not applicable	Trade regulation, responsible sourcing, global risk exposure	Tracks export restrictions on 65 raw materials. Offers Due Diligence Guidance on conflict minerals. Focuses on long-term structural risks and supply governance.
USGS	Legal definition from the U.S. Energy Act of 2020. Assessment based on strategic importance and vulnerability to disruption.	Supply risk, economic importance, U.S. import reliance	Fixed list (50 critical minerals, reviewed periodically)	Economic security, defense, energy and high-tech sectors	Combines quantitative indicators (e.g., production share, import dependence) with expert judgement. Excludes widely available commodities like copper and aluminium.
World Bank	Demand-driven framework based on projected mineral intensity across clean energy technologies.	Projected demand growth, cross-technology relevance	No list; 4 categories based on expected impact	Mineral needs for solar, wind, storage, etc.	Classifies minerals by sectoral importance: high-impact, medium-impact, cross-cutting. Focuses on forward-looking demand under climate scenarios.
WTO – ADB	Trade-based mapping of mineral-related products using existing national and international lists.	Trade exposure and value chain positioning	No harmonized list; about 250 HS-coded products (raw, intermediate, finished)	Global trade in energy transition materials	Focuses on trade flows and product stages, not criticality per se. Valuable for understanding supply chain stages and export composition.

Sources: UNCTAD mapping based on -—
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Bringing a developing economy perspective to critical minerals

Emerging academic research emphasizes that mineral criticality is context-dependent, shaped by national priorities, capacities and development goals rather than being an inherent or fixed property. Most existing frameworks reflect the perspectives of high-income importing countries, focusing on supply risks and economic importance -—
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—-. In contrast, mineral-exporting developing economies, such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo (cobalt), Indonesia (nickel), Chile (copper and lithium), and Brazil (niobium and REEs), tend to prioritize domestic industrial development, environmental governance and trade leverage.

For instance, Indonesia restricts exports of unprocessed nickel to boost local processing and manufacturing, while Chile is developing public-private partnerships to manage its lithium industry more effectively. These cases highlight the need for frameworks that consider a country’s ability to move up the value chain, through processing or advanced manufacturing, and its institutional capacity to compete in global markets.

Extending this developmental perspective, -—
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—- propose a dynamic framework that integrates global supply-demand factors with national capacities in extraction, processing and governance. Rather than relying on a fixed mineral list, they prioritize minerals central to the green transition—such as lithium, cobalt and REEs—allowing for flexible classification informed by country-specific contexts which could also be more suited for emerging and resource-rich economies. These frameworks advocate aligning mineral policy not only with supply security and international demand but also with national priorities.

The Africa Green Minerals Strategy underscores the importance of using mineral resources to drive domestic value addition, job creation and regional industrialization, moving beyond Africa’s traditional role as a raw material exporter -—
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—-. It sees the rising global demand for critical minerals, shaped by efforts to reach toward net-zero emissions, as an opportunity to link mineral development with broader goals, such as strengthening climate resilience, diversifying economies and reducing poverty through inclusive growth. The Africa Mining Vision -—
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UNCTAD assessed national and regional strategies related to minerals and their economic role. This revealed a diversity of terminology, including critical minerals, strategic minerals, green minerals and critical raw minerals, depending on context (see table 3).

Table 3. Terminology related to critical minerals differs based on context, country and purpose

Labeling	Countries-Regions
Critical minerals	Argentina, Indonesia, South Africa, Australia, Canada, United Kingdom, United States of America
Critical raw materials	European Union
Green minerals	African Union
Industrial minerals Minerals of strategic economic importance	Argentina
Strategic Minerals	Argentina, Brazil, China, Colombia, India, Indonesia

Source: UNCTAD mapping based on Ministerio de Economía, Argentina -—
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Countries define and communicate about critical minerals differently, with some publishing strategies (e.g., EU or the United Kingdom) or acts (e.g., Argentina and Brazil), and others offering preliminary assessments (e.g., Colombia and Indonesia). An analysis of 13 countries and regions reveals eight factors for assessing how critical a mineral is for: the economy, energy transition, industry, infrastructure, international trade, security, supply chains and technology, and these can be disaggregated further into their sub-factors (see annex 3.).

Developing economies’ assessments of critical minerals are more varied, often focusing on inputs for domestic industries and national security. Supply risk is the most cited criterion overall, mentioned by eight of thirteen countries or regions, universally by developed economies, but only by one-third of developing ones. Developing economies also highlight criteria such as food security, defense, industrial development, employment and comparative advantage. They place particular emphasis on the role of minerals in generating government revenue and foreign exchange.

In contrast, developed economies uniquely emphasize maintaining supply chains, international trade and economic stability. They also consider alternative sourcing, recycling and substitution options. Only half of the countries explicitly reference the energy transition, digital economy or technology in their definitions, though most strategies are implicitly linked to these goals.

A more inclusive understanding of critical minerals can reflect diverse economic structures, such as the importance of agriculture and food security, and account for mineral endowments, market concentration and fiscal dependence, especially in resource-rich developing countries.

While there is overlap in mineral lists, developing economies often include gold and iron ore, excluded from most developed country lists due to their large, liquid markets. Their inclusion reflects their fiscal and developmental importance in the global South.

What is critical today might not be tomorrow

UNCTAD’s classification of critical minerals aims to be dynamic. Minerals like lithium and cobalt have become essential due to their role in battery production, with demand expected to rise sharply by 2040 -—
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—-, are gaining attention for emerging technologies. Meanwhile, advances in recycling, substitution and efficiency can reduce reliance on primary materials, reshaping which minerals are considered critical. As these factors evolve, so must the frameworks used to define criticality.

Geopolitical shifts, trade tensions and supply disruptions also influence mineral criticality. This calls for adaptable strategies in resource management and international cooperation. Minerals represent both risks and opportunities, for industrialization, green growth and trade diversification.

However, several challenges limit countries’ ability to assess and benefit from their mineral resources. A key issue is the lack of specific trade data for informed policy action. HS codes often group minerals into broad categories, and this is compounded by missing or inconsistent trade data. These gaps hinder efforts to monitor trade, assess risks and design effective policies. As critical minerals gain importance, improving detailed trade data by means of capacity building becomes more urgent.

Future work could further explore the priorities of developing economies, incorporating broader criteria aligned with their development needs. This includes integrating environmental and social dimensions, such as recycling potential, responsible sourcing and early circular economy practices. In addition, the list of critical minerals should remain adaptable to reflect emerging technologies, sectoral shifts and evolving development goals. Improving the granularity of trade classifications, particularly through engagement with the World Customs Organization on HS code revisions, is essential to better capture mineral processing stages and product differentiation. This would enable expanding analysis to finished goods and enhancing trade data quality through cooperation with customs and national statistical offices. Country case studies could help to deepen the understanding of value creation. In the future, UNCTAD’s could integrate greenfield and firm-level investment data as a complementary source for information on production alongside trade data.

Finally, the UNCTAD16 intergovernmental meeting offers a platform for member States to discuss evolving priorities and provide input on analytical needs based on national goals and technological trends. UNCTAD’s current list of critical-strategic minerals is a starting point. It is designed to evolve, guided by a multidimensional approach that reflects global relevance and development needs, especially for energy, digital and industrial transitions.

Annexes

Annex 1. UNCTAD’s approach to identifying critical minerals

To develop a comprehensive and inclusive list of critical minerals relevant to global energy transition and industrial needs and tailored to reflect the priorities of both developing and developed economies, UNCTAD undertook a systematic, multi-step exercise. The process was designed to be transparent, data-driven and grounded in expert input. The list was built from the ground up, starting with national and regional priorities, refined through expert consultations, and validated using trade data. A key innovation is the systematic mapping of each mineral to HS codes, enabling robust trade analysis and policy relevance. The methodology involved reviewing national and institutional critical mineral lists, assessing country strategies, and refining selections through expert feedback and trade indicators. The final output, a harmonized list of 60 critical minerals, mapped by 499 HS codes, supports trade policy analysis while accounting for global development priorities. Below is an overview of the key steps in UNCTAD’s methodology.

Step 1: Review of country, regional and institutional critical mineral lists

UNCTAD compiled critical mineral lists from national, regional and international sources, including Argentina, Brazil, Canada, China, India, Japan and the United States; regional bodies like the African Union and European Union; and international organizations including the IEA, OECD, IRENA, WTO-ADB, World Bank and ESCWA.

Step 2: Assessment of country strategies and criteria for critical minerals

UNCTAD carried out an assessment of countries’ strategies and criteria for identifying critical minerals. This provided a validation to the selection of minerals to be included on UNCTAD’s comprehensive list, intended to ensure inclusive consideration of minerals that are critical for both developed and developing economies. The review assessed a sample of strategic documents and how they approached critical minerals, including in African Union, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, European Union, India, Indonesia, South Africa, United Kingdom and the United States of America.

Step 3. Selection of a list of critical minerals

UNCTAD developed a reference list of 85 critical raw and semi-processed materials based on mapped classifications and country-level strategic priorities. The selection reflects the needs of both developing and developed economies, with a focus on clean energy, digitalization and industrial growth. Expert judgment, trade exposure and targeted data were used. The list adopts an inclusive approach but includes instances of double counting, such as listing REEs as a group alongside individual elements (e.g., dysprosium, neodymium), and similarly for PMG.

Step 4: HS code identification using HS 2022

Each mineral was matched to appropriate 6-digit HS codes based on traded forms (e.g., ores, refined metals). Care was taken to avoid misclassification, especially for mixed-use products. Some materials were grouped due to classification challenges, resulting in a final list of 60 critical minerals, covering raw and semi-processed minerals. Special attention was paid to distinguishing between pure substances and downstream or mixed-use products.

Step 5. Backward correspondence across HS revisions

To enable historical trade analysis, HS 2022 codes were mapped to earlier versions (HS 2017, 2012, 2007, 2002) using official tables and expert input. This ensured consistency across countries and time periods.

Step 6. Trade data integration and validation

Mapped HS codes were used to extract trade data from UN Comtrade. Volumes and values were validated through cross-checks, producing a consistent dataset for analyzing trade flows and dependencies.

Step 7. Grouping minerals by energy transition relevance

Minerals were categorized into three groups:

• Required for the energy transition (27)
• Relevant to the energy transition (10)
• Other critical minerals (23)

This classification integrates global frameworks (e.g., IEA, World Bank) and regional priorities (e.g., ESCWA), including UNCTAD expertise. The grouping supports targeted analysis of materials essential to green technologies like electric vehicles, solar panels and hydrogen systems.

Step 8. Classifying minerals by criticality status

After compiling the relevant trade data, we calculated indicators based on HS codes. We ultimately focused on two key indicators:

1. Revealed Comparative Advantage
2. Trade Concentration Index (for both exports and imports)

Using these indicators, the scores for each mineral across different regions were generated. Based on these scores, minerals have been categorized into three levels of criticality: High, Moderate and Low. Additional indicators, such as dependency ratios, can be considered to further refine the assessment.

Annex 2. Full UNCTAD list (mapped to HS Codes)

Figure 11. Mapping UNCTAD’s list of critical minerals

Hierarchical breakdown of 6-digit HS 2022 codes for UNCTAD-listed critical minerals

Note: The complete UNCTAD's HS code classification for critical minerals, including revisions from 2002 to 2022, is available for download.

Annex 3. Comparative overview of national and regional approaches to Critical Minerals assessment

Table 4. Eight factors of national and regional critical mineral assessments

Policy Theme	Sub-Category (Factor)	Developed Countries	Developing Countries
A. Economy	Consumption	European Union, United Kingdom	Colombia
	Digital Economy	Canada	South Africa
	Employment		Argentina, Colombia
	Importance	Australia	India, Indonesia
	Resource availability	Canada	Colombia, India, Indonesia
	Value addition	European Union, United Kingdom	Argentina, Indonesia
B. Energy Transition	Inputs	Canada	African Union, Colombia, South Africa
C. Industry	Availability of processing technology		Indonesia
	Development		African Union, Argentina, China
	Inputs	United States of America	African Union, Argentina, Brazil, Indonesia
D. Infrastructure	Development		Colombia
E. International Trade	Comparative advantage		Argentina, Brazil
	Demand of industrialized countries		Argentina
	Government revenue generation		Argentina, Indonesia
	Import substitution		Argentina
	Increase foreign exchange reserves		Argentina, Indonesia
	Market control		Indonesia
	Positioning as strategic partner	Canada
	Reliance on imports	European Union, United Kingdom	Argentina, India
	Surplus in trade balance		Brazil
F. Security	Defense		China, India, Indonesia
	Economic security	Canada, USA	China
	Food Security		Argentina, Colombia, India
	National security	Australia, Canada, USA
G. Supply Chains	Alternative sourcing	United Kingdom
	Availability of Substitutes	European Union
	Concentration of sourcing	European Union, United Kingdom
	Lack of substitutes		Argentina, Indonesia
	Recycling	European Union, United Kingdom
	Supply risk	Australia, Canada, European Union, United Kingdom, USA	Argentina, India, Indonesia
H. Technology	Inputs	Australia	Brazil, Indonesia

Source: UNCTAD mapping based on Ministerio de Economía, Argentina -—
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Note: The strategies of Colombia and Indonesia are preliminary. All labels are included in this table.

Notes

1. Although the term ‘minerals’ is used throughout for simplicity, the analysis covers both minerals and metals. For instance, it refers to minerals that are economically important and face a high risk of supply disruption. Many of these minerals are sources of critical metals, for example, lithium, cobalt, nickel and REEs are all classified as critical minerals, and they yield metals that are essential for clean energy technologies, electronics and defense applications. So, while not all metals are considered critical, many critical minerals do produce or contain metals, and the terms are often used together in this strategic context.
2. The estimate refers to total IFFs from all sources, not just those related to trade in critical minerals. These flows include tax evasion, corruption and other illicit activities that drain public resources and undermine development -—
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3. See, for example, -—
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References

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Gender inequality persists globally, impacting economic participation, education, health, and political empowerment, affecting women’s lives globally. Despite advancements, significant disparities remain. In 2023, UN Women estimated that at the current rate, it will take 286 years to close gender gaps in legal protection, 140 years for women to be represented equally in positions of power and leadership, and 47 years to attain equal representation in national parliaments -—
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The UNCTAD ministerial meeting, in Bridgetown, concluded that policies need to go beyond encompassing a gender perspective and actively promote the inclusion and empowerment of women and youth -—
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—-. The ministers underscored the importance of gender-disaggregated data to build the evidence base for such policies. This SDG Pulse In Focus represents commitment to this work, and UNCTAD has spearheaded efforts to advance this area, including through the release of the first ever set of gender equality in trade indicators in July 2024.

The indicators are calculated based on data derived from international databases include employment and earnings by sex in tradable sectors, trade-intensive and trade-dependent industries. These data enable for the first-time to gain insights about international trade from a gender perspective across the world.

Globally, women employees are underrepresented in tradable sectors, representing only 36 per cent of persons employed in tradable sectors in developed and 39 per cent in developing economies. However, their employment in the trade of services has increased at a faster rate than men’s, highlighting the potential for trade in services to enhance women's economic empowerment, particularly in regions like Africa, Asia, and Oceania. Women’s contribution to domestic value added in exports still lags significantly behind men’s, though it is higher in services exports compared to agriculture and industry. Understanding these emerging patterns to inform effective policy actions will require further country-specific analyses to identify drivers and barriers to women’s participation in high value-added sectors unique to each economy.

Leveraging trade as a catalyst for economic empowerment

Trade plays a crucial role in economic growth and poverty reduction. Thus, inequalities in trade participation and in the distribution of benefits significantly impact people’s lives. In the last three decades, the global poverty rate fell from 38 per cent in 1990 to just below 9 per cent in 2022 -—
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Furthermore, recently these trends got disrupted by the pandemic, war and crises. An estimated 23 million more people were living in extreme poverty in 2022 compared to 2019 -—
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—-. Understanding the complex relationship between the economy, trade and gender equality is essential for effective decision-making.

UNCTAD's initial analysis reveals an association between trade openness and women’s economic empowerment. According to the GGPI and WEI indices less than 1 per cent of women and girls reside in a country with high women’s empowerment and gender parity (figure 1), mainly in Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden, while developing economies, such as Iran, Iraq, Lebanon and Pakistan in Asia, and Benin and Nigeria in Africa lag behind. While the impact of trade liberalization on gender inequality depends on multiple factors, research shows several channels by which trade policy can improve gender equality in wages and employment -—
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—-. Liberalization can drive firms to adopt new technologies and reduce discrimination, making jobs less physically demanding and improving opportunities for women. However, changes in the sectoral structure of production due to liberalization can have both positive and negative effects on gender inequality.

Figure 1. Developed economies generally exhibit greater openness to trade together with enhanced women’s empowerment and gender equality

Source: UNCTAD calculations based on -—
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Note: GGPI and WEI were published by the UNDP in 2023. Values of GGPI and WEI greater than 0.6 are considered medium parity, and values greater than 0.8 are considered high parity. The UNCTAD’s trade openness index analyzes countries’ economic dependence on exports and imports. The bubble size refers to the trade openness index. Trade values correspond to the sum of exports and imports of goods and services.

While the importance of women’s economic empowerment for closing gender gaps is widely acknowledged, data to enable effective action to close gender gaps remains rare. This lack of data means that gender equality indices continue to limit the focus of economic empowerment on the labour market and political participation -—
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—- measures gender parity across four key dimensions, which do not mention trade. The lack of data makes it challenging to analyse the impact of trade on gender equality hindering effective policy making.

Trade significantly influences employment and business opportunities of women and men, their income, social status, welfare, and equality. Export-oriented industries such as textiles and apparel, often employ a large number of female workers -—
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—-, making up to 33 per cent of the workforce of exporting firms in developing economies, compared with just 24 per cent of non-exporting firms -—
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However, trade can also exacerbate existing gender inequalities, particularly if accompanying trade policies do not include measures to address social and economic inequalities. Women working in global value chains often occupy low-skill and non-managerial jobs, despite being more likely to hold formal jobs -—
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New data linking initiatives to bridge the gap

Despite the urgent need to analyse trade from a gender perspective, only a few countries regularly compile sex-disaggregated indicators linked to international trade, and some countries do so on an ad hoc basis. For example, Finland and New Zealand linked such data to find that women were underrepresented in international trade both as employees and business owners (See National efforts to produce statistics on gender and trade). Some countries have also collected additional data by specialized surveys on trade and gender, such as Chile -—
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—- and some international organizations, like the World Bank, support countries by carrying out such surveys. These can provide more in-depth information on trade barriers or informal cross-border trade to inform policy but may be costly to carry out.

Prompted by the Buenos Aires declaration -—
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—- and collaboration with pioneering countries and organizations, UNCTAD developed the ‘Conceptual Framework for the Measurement of Gender Equality in Trade' -—
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Women continue to be underrepresented in trade across regions

Women’s underrepresentation in tradable sectors is evident across regions, as indicated by UNCTAD’s data (figure 2). 36 per cent of employees in tradable sectors are women in developed economies compared to 39 per cent in developing economies. Notably, African countries exhibit the lowest gender employment gap in tradable sectors, with women comprising 42 per cent of employees compared to 58 per cent for men.

Figure 2. Women employees are underrepresented in tradable sectors across regions, 2022

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Notes: Classification of tradable and non-tradable sectors is derived based on -—
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Women face barriers to trade participation, such as unequal access to resources, limited training opportunities, and cultural constraints. UNCTAD’s studies also highlight the disproportionate burden of care and household work and women’s higher participation in low productivity work are major constraints to women's full economic empowerment -—
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Analysis of OECD countries revealed that 11 per cent of women-led firms export internationally compared to 19 per cent of men-led firms. However, once involved in exports, women-led firms do so to a similar or larger number of countries than firms led by men, suggesting the particular importance of policies aimed at removing entry barriers for women entrepreneurs -—
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Services trade offers increasing potential for women’s economic empowerment

Women are concentrated in the services sector in all regions. Figure 3 shows a rising share of services as an employer of both women and men from 1991 to 2022 in all regions. The shift to services is also mirrored in international trade as growth of trade in services is surpassing that of goods since 2011 -—
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Figure 3. Women's employment in services increased at a faster rate than men's since 1991

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In manufacturing, high shares of female employment typically align with whether an industry is capital-intensive (technology-dependent) or labour-intensive. Low technology-intensive industries which typically employ more women (termed feminization of labour), such as food and beverages and textiles, often face higher tariffs on imported inputs than other industries. Such tariffs can elevate trade costs and hinder the competitiveness of sectors that offer employment opportunities for women -—
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Figure 4. Share of female employees is higher in low technology-intensive manufacturing industries compared to more capital-intensive industries

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Women produce 20-40 per cent of total export value depending on region

Women’s contributions to domestic value added in gross exports lag behind men’s across all regions. This indicates that women’s contribution to the production of goods and services exported worldwide still trails that of men (figure 5). For example, in 2020 women’s largest contribution to domestic value added in gross exports was estimated at 40 per cent in developed economies, while in Africa women only produced one fourth of the total generated exported value. In developing Americas and developing Asia and Oceania, men’s contributions were nearly double that of female generated domestic value added in gross exports.

Figure 5. Women’s contributions to domestic value added in gross exports lag behind men’s across all regions, 2020

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Note: Aggregated figures are based on data on employment and trade in value added for 76 economies. This analysis assumes that there are no differences in gender distribution between exporting and non-exporting firms. The proportions of male and female contributions to domestic value added are calculated assuming homogeneity in labour intensity, skills, etc., thereby stating that women represent a comparable share of value added to their proportion in employment.

Analysis by sectors reveals an intriguing pattern: women’s domestic value added is higher in services exports compared to agriculture and industry in most regions (figure 6). This suggests that trade in services offers greater opportunities for women to contribute to exports in developed economies, developing Africa and the Americas. For instance, in developed economies women’s domestic value added in services nearly equals men’s, whereas their contribution to agriculture and industry exports is approximately one third of that of men’s.

Figure 6. In most regions, women’s domestic value added is higher in services gross exports compared to agriculture and industry, 2020

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Note: Aggregated figures are based on data on employment and trade in value added for 76 economies. This analysis assumes that there are no differences in gender distribution between exporting and non-exporting firms. The proportions of male and female contributions to domestic value added are calculated assuming homogeneity in labour intensity, skills, etc., thereby stating that women represent a comparable share of value added to their proportion in employment.

To further explore women’s contribution to higher value-added exports, the analysis examines exports of goods and services that add more than 50 per cent to the domestic value added in exports. Figure 7 shows that women's share of employment is higher in economies where services exports contribute more than 50 per cent to the domestic value added, compared to economies where goods exports contribute more than 50 per cent. This supports WTO’s argument that services trade may benefit women in the labour market, as services sectors exhibit greater gender balance than manufacturing or mining -—
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Figure 7. Economies with high exported value added from services show greater female employment rates compared to goods-producing industries

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Note: The year for the reported employment varies from 2008 to 2020 based on the latest available with most data reported for 2019 or later. Country data for high-exported value added – i.e. sectors contributing more than 50% to the domestic value added in gross exports. Sectors are aggregated into two groups: goods (primary goods and manufacturers) and services.

While UNCTAD’s first set of trade and gender indicators show that women are still underrepresented in tradable sectors and contribute less to creating domestic value added content in exports across regions, a sectoral analysis reveals opportunities to catalyse trade for women’s economic empowerment. Trade in services presents an opportunity for women to contribute to the growth of exports in most regions. Nevertheless, a further in-depth analysis can help to identify specific drivers and bottlenecks of women’s contribution to high-value sectors unique to each economy. This approach requires country-level linking of micro-data to enable more accurate insights to inform policy action, such as the following examples of UNCTAD’s collaboration with Finland and Georgia.

Women’s contribution to domestic value-added exports in Finland

A small open economy like Finland benefits from globalization and foreign trade significantly. The share of exports in GDP is high up to 30 per cent, but the benefits of trade are unevenly distributed between businesses, employees and consumers -—
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—-. Statistics show a high concentration of exports in the largest enterprises, and higher salaries paid by trading firms compared to others. Importantly, the study showed that women work less often in trading companies, and only one fifth of businesses engaged in exports are female owned.

Gender gap widens as firm size increases.

Statistics Finland releases annually experimental statistics on trade in value added. These can be compiled by linking existing data sources without additional data collection. An analysis of domestic value added embodied in exports, whether through direct or indirect export dependencies, reveals insights into the role of firms and export-supported jobs (figure 8). While larger enterprises in Finland provide many jobs supported by exports, the proportion of jobs that are export-supported is smaller in the largest enterprises, since they often engage with smaller intermediaries to produce intermediate goods for them.³

The global value chain analysis reveals that in Finland women’s share of jobs supported by exports is 32 per cent compared with 38 per cent for men. Interestingly, while export-supported jobs in micro-firms are almost equally distributed between women (20 per cent) and men (21 per cent), the gender gap widens as firm size increases. In large firms, 30 per cent of women’s jobs are supported by exports compared to 43 per cent of men’s jobs.

Figure 8. Finland’s women’s contribution to domestic value added is lower than men’s contribution with widening gap in larger firms, 2021

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Women’s employment, wages and entrepreneurship in trade in Georgia

Gender aspects of trade statistics become very relevant to addressing issues related to welfare and equality. There’s high interest from state institutions, international partners and non-governmental organizations,Gogita Todradze, executive director of Georgia’s National Statistics Office

Georgia was the inaugural pilot country supported by UNECE and UNCTAD in developing sex-disaggregated trade indicators through microdata linking (See UNCTAD in Action: Gender and Trade).⁴ This involved linking annual goods trade data with key sex-disaggregated variables from business statistics and the structure of earnings survey. The linked company-employee data represented over 85 per cent of both exports and imports value in Georgia.

High-skill female workers face less gender inequalities.

The study revealed gender gaps in employment and wages. Women-to-men employment ratios in trading companies ranged from 57 to 64 per cent over the five-year period, while the gender pay gap fluctuated between 30 and 35 per cent. Further analysis by skill levels indicated that high-skill workers had the lowest gender pay gap (18 per cent for importers, 31 per cent for two-way traders), while the gaps for managers and low-skill workers were between 38 and 45 per cent. Gender indicators disaggregated by skill levels highlighted that, generally, high skilled female workers experienced less disparity in trade, both in their employment and pay (figures 9 and 10). Higher education levels could protect women from some gender inequalities.

Figure 9. Gender employment gap in trading companies is lowest among high-skilled workers in Georgia, 2017

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Note: Two-way traders are defined as firms involved in both exports and imports of goods.

Figure 10. Gender pay gap is the highest among low-skilled workers in trading enterprises in Georgia, 2017

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Note: Two-way traders are defined as firms involved in both exports and imports of goods.

The data linking exercise also facilitated the analysis of female and male entrepreneurs in trade. It revealed that men own trading companies five times more often than women (figure 11). Drawing on these data insights, Georgia plans to include gender-in-trade statistics in its regular statistical production to inform design of policies that encourage women entrepreneurship, as well as increase job opportunities and wages for women in international trade.

Figure 11. In Georgia, men own five times more trading companies than women, 2017

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Note: Two-way traders are defined as firms involved in both exports and imports of goods.

More inclusive economies reach higher productive capacities

Enhancing a country’s productive capacities — comprising of human and natural capital, energy, transport and ICT capacities, well-functioning institutions and private sector, and structural change — fuels inclusive economic growth and resilience. Investments in productive capacities yield immediate economic benefits but also lay the groundwork for sustained growth by creating jobs, enhancing skills, and promoting equitable development. Generally, the propensity to build productive capacities is higher in countries with well-crafted and informed economic, trade, industrial, as well as science and technology policies -—
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The strong relationship between inclusive growth and productive capacities is illustrated in figure 12. It also shows that economies with higher PCI scores primarily consist of developed economies that rank high on the IGI equality dimension, which measures labour and political participation, income distribution, education, and gender distribution of social reproduction. Among developing economies, Asia and Oceania demonstrate higher average equality scores, whereas African economies exhibit significant diversity in equality, suggesting that women’s productive capacities have not been optimally developed and utilized -—
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Figure 12. Developed economies reveal higher PCI and IGI equality scores in 2021

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Note: The figure compares overall PCI scores (x-axis) and IGI equality scores (y-axis). The size of the bubbles refers to the overall IGI scores. IGI is composed of four dimensions – economy, living conditions, equality and environment.

Domestic value added in gross exports is closely linked to productive capacities because it reflects the extent to which a country's domestic resources, capabilities and production processes contribute to the final goods and services that are exported. In 2020, total value added, as measured by domestic value added in gross exports, is estimated at almost $15 trillion globally, with 3 per cent generated in agriculture, 56 per cent in industry and 42 per cent in services -—
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Figure 13. Developed economies reveal higher PCI scores and higher contribution of women to domestic value added in gross exports in services

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Note: The year for the reported employment varies from 2015 to 2020 based on the latest available. Country data for high-exported value added – i.e. sectors contributing more than 50% to the domestic value added in gross exports. Sectors are aggregated into two groups: goods (primary goods and manufacturers) and services.

While a clear division between developed and developing economies exists in their productive capacities, some outliers, particularly in the service sector, warrant examination. To understand why some economies follow a different path, PCA was used to assess the main factors affecting gender inequality in trade. This analysis, based on 19 indicators (see table 1) for 62 economies available from the OECD TiVA database -—
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The analysis identifies four principal components, namely education and social conditions (PC1), trade and labour participation (PC2) and political empowerment and participation in decision-making (PC3 and PC4) which explain 71 per cent of the total variance of gender equality. The first component mostly represents preconditions for trade participation for women and men: motivations, aspirations, resources, and constraints. The second points to their degree of involvement in trade. The third one stands for political empowerment and participation in various levels of decision-making.

Figure 14. Developed economies reveal higher gender equality in education and social conditions and in trade participation in contrast to developing economies

Source: Data for the analysis is collected from multiple sources, UNCTAD Gender-in-trade indicators -—
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Note: The figure shows gender equality in education and social conditions (PC1) on the x-axis and gender equality in trade and labour participation (PC2) on the y-axis.

Developed economies stand out as a relatively homogenous group with higher gender equality in education and social conditions and in trade participation with a stark contrast to developing economies (figure 14). They also boast better social conditions and higher women’s empowerment and wages.

Various patterns of gender equality in trade emerge across different countries. In a cluster including Cambodia, Lao PDR, Peru and Viet Nam, women participate significantly in trade, particularly in industries and sectors heavily reliant on trade. Conversely, a group of economies represented on the right side of figure 14 (Bangladesh, Egypt, Jordan, India, Pakistan and Tunisia) faces unfavourable conditions for women’s economic participation, resulting in limited benefits from trade. Nordic and Benelux countries share similarities in high levels of women’s empowerment, institutional representation, education, and wages, grouping them together. Similarly, Eastern European economies demonstrate commonalities in high female labour force and trade participation. These diverse patterns highlight the complex interplay between gender equality, trade participation, and economic and social conditions across different regions.

Table 1. Summary of gender-relevant indicators used for the PCA analysis

Component	Gender equality dimension	Indicator
PC 1	Education and social conditions	Restricted access to productive and financial assets index (SIGI)
		Adolescent birth rate (births per 1,000 women ages 15–19)
		Discrimination in the family index (SIGI)
		Ever-partnered women and girls subjected to physical and/or sexual violence by a current or former intimate partner in the previous 12 months (% ages 15–49)
		Labour force participation rate among prime-working-age individuals who are living in a household comprising a couple and at least one child under age 6, female (% ages 25–54)
		Population with completed secondary education or higher, female (% ages 25 and older)
		Restricted physical integrity index (SIGI)
		Women of reproductive age whose need for family planning is satisfied with modern methods (% ages 15–49)
		Youth not in education, employment or training, female (% ages 15–24)
PC 2	Trade and labour participation	Average monthly earnings of female employees in high exported value added industries (2017 PPP $)
		Average monthly earnings of female employees in tradable sectors (2017 PPP $)
		Share of female employees in high exported value added in industries (%)
		Share of female employees in high export-intensive industries (%)
		Share of female employees in top 5 export-intensive industries (country level) (%)
		Share of female employees in tradable sectors (%)
PC 3 & 4	Political empowerment and participation in decision-making	Restricted civil liberties index (SIGI)
		Share of managerial positions held by women (%)
		Share of seats held by women, local governments (%)
		Share of seats held by women, parliament (%)

Source: Data for the analysis is collected from multiple sources, UNCTAD Gender-in-trade indicators -—
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Note: Indicators are grouped into gender equality dimensions based on the PCA results.

Trade policy as a driving force to bridge gender inequality gaps

Gender equality amplifies human progress, economic growth, and social development. Governments play a crucial role by allocating funds for essential services, investing in education, social support and legal reforms shaping policies and taking actions to enhance economic empowerment, and combatting gender-based barriers and violence.

UNCTAD, jointly with UN Women -—
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Trade policy is increasingly recognized as a means to address gender disparities and promote inclusive trade. Today, approximately one-fourth of RTAs incorporate gender-related provisions -—
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Incorporating stand-alone gender chapters in trade agreements has enhanced the visibility of gender issues in trade policymaking, especially through requirements to assess progress with agreed indicators. UNCTAD has developed ways to link statistical data to assess the gender impacts of trade agreements, with support by the European Commission -—
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Data and analysis are key to understanding the complex dynamics essential for achieving more gender equal trade. These dynamics are shaped by various factors, including domestic labour markets, cultural norms, legal frameworks, international markets and economic fluctuations. Such interactions are highly country-specific, what works in one country may not yield results in another.

Table 2. FTAs with gender chapters

Agreements with gender chapters	Type	Year
Chile-Uruguay FTA	Bilateral	2016
Chile-Argentina FTA	Bilateral	2017
Chile-Brazil FTA	Bilateral	2018
Chile-Ecuador FTA	Bilateral	2020
United Kingdom-Japan FTA	Bilateral	2020
Canada-Chile amended FTA	Bilateral	2019
Canada-Israel amended FTA	Bilateral	2019
United Kingdom-Australia FTA	Bilateral	2021
United Kingdom -New Zealand FTA	Bilateral	2021

Source: UNCTAD Trade, Gender and Development Programme

Trade agreements have the potential to significantly advance gender equality, particularly when they recognize and harness the transformative power of gender equality for our societies. Economies with higher productive capacities tend to achieve greater gender equality and more inclusive growth. Gender equality is essential for long-term structural transformation by improving human capital allocation, but sustainable economic development also relies on aggregate demand and macroeconomic policies. While the global dataset offers new insights into gender and trade, linking country-level micro-data is needed to inform effective policy action. Greater involvement of women and civil society representatives in negotiation and monitoring of trade agreements is critical to enhance positive outcomes of trade policies. UNCTAD supports governments in sensitizing trade officials to gender implications, enhancing data and analytical capacities, and carrying out ex ante impact assessments.

★ UNCTAD in Action ★

Gender and Trade

2 200 people trained on UNCTAD’s e-learning courses on trade and gender in 2015-2023.

Since 2015, UNCTAD’s e-learning courses on trade and gender have addressed the knowledge gap about how gender and trade interlink, and how trade policies can contribute to reducing gender inequalities, targeting especially developing and least developed countries. To date, nearly 2 200 people (62 per cent women) in 154 countries have benefitted from 25 iterations of the online course (figure 15). Participants speak about their experience in this video.

Figure 15. Over 60 per cent of people trained in UNCTAD’s e-courses on trade and gender were from Africa in 2015-2023

Source: UNCTAD Trade, Gender and Development Programme

Six countries compiled new indicators and more than 500 experts were trained.

UNCTAD spearheaded efforts on gender equality in trade statistics following the Buenos Aires Declaration -—
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This informed the development of Compilation Guidelines -—
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Table 3. UNCTAD trained more than 500 people in 11 events on gender and trade statistics

Type of workshop	Number of workshops	Total number of participants
Regional workshop	4	302
National workshops	6	188
Interregional training workshop	1	32
Total	11	522

Source: UNDA project “Data and statistics for more gender-responsive trade policies in Africa, the Caucasus and Central Asia”

Increased capacity of over 500 small-scale traders in six countries.

Informal cross-border trade is largely driven by women as one of the few options available to them due to their time constraints, limited access to resources, and lower education levels. Despite their critical role, they often face challenges, such as regulatory barriers, high duties, poor border facilities, weak border governance, corruption and harassment, resulting in minimal benefits from trading.

Small-scale traders also encounter challenges beyond checkpoints, including information gaps on rules, regulations and market demand. Additionally, supply side obstacles such as difficulties in business registration and limited capital resources further impede their success.

To address these barriers, UNCTAD initiated a capacity-building programme for women in small-scale informal cross-border trade. The programme aims to raise awareness of trade rules and customs procedures, enhance entrepreneurial skills (see UNCTAD in Action on Empretec) and facilitate dialogue with border authorities. In 2019-2023, 18 workshops were delivered focusing on trade rules, customs procedures and entrepreneurship at 9 border crossings in Botswana, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia, benefiting 547 cross-border traders, most of which were women (map 1).

Map 1. Over 500 small-scale traders trained on trade procedures and entrepreneurship skills, 2019-2023

Source: UNCTAD Trade, Gender and Development Programme

International treaties and agreements related to gender equality

Numerous international agreements aim to promote gender equality, urging countries to safeguard women’s rights.

Figure 16. Timeline of international treaties and agreements related to gender equality

Source: UNCTAD

The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) is a landmark treaty adopted in 1979, obligating signatory states to combat discrimination against women in various fields, including politics, law, employment, education, and healthcare -—
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In the realm of trade, the Addis Ababa Action Agenda -—
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Notes

1. For instance, UNCTAD analysis of three major global gender equality indices (The Global Gender Gap Index (GGI), The Gender Inequality Index (GII), The Social Institutions and Gender Index (SIGI) revealed that none of them reported indicators related to trade.
2. WEI is comprised of 10 indicators related life and good health (two indicators); education, skill-building and knowledge (two indicators); labour and financial inclusion (two indicators), participation in decision making (three indicators); and freedom from violence (one indicator). GGPI is a composite index that assesses the relative achievements between women and men in four dimensions: life and good health (one indicator); education, skill-building and knowledge (two indicators); labour and financial inclusion (two indicators); and participation in decision making (three indicators). Source: -—
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3. This analysis is made in relation to the size of the producing firms, not exporting firms. When producing goods for exports, large firms typically use intermediate goods, which are either produced by other (smaller) firms domestically or imported.
4. Georgia’s National Statistical Office was the first to take part in the UNDA project titled "Data and statistics for more gender-responsive trade policies in Africa, the Caucasus, and Central Asia".
5. UNCTAD in partnership with UNDESA and UNDP calculated the costs along six key “transition pathways” that can amplify efforts and speed up progress towards the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. In addition to these six pathways, UNCTAD is working with UN Women to estimate the cost of achieving gender equality for certain gender-related SDG indicators.
6. The study covered the following border crossings: Noe-Elubo border (Côte d'Ivoire–Ghana); Afl­ao–Kodjoviakope (Ghana–Togo); Segbe–Kpoglo (Ghana–Togo); Hillacondji–Sanve econdji (Togo–Benin); Seme–Krake (Benin–Nigeria).
7. In Rwanda, informal cross-border trade is defined as transactions in goods between residents and non-residents of the country that are not documented through official customs clearance system and ultimately not included in the official statistics. They constitute exports and imports of goods and exclude smuggled goods; transit goods; goods properly (100 per cent) declared and verified by the customs officials on declaration documents.

References

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