Goal 8 – UNCTAD SDG Pulse 2025 / UNCTAD SDG Pulse 2025 provides an update on the evolution of a selection of official SDG indicators and complementary data and statistics about the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs. Thu, 26 Jun 2025 09:41:46 +0000 en-US hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=6.8.3 /wp-content/uploads/2019/01/cropped-apple-touch-icon-32x32.png Goal 8 – UNCTAD SDG Pulse 2025 / 32 32 Attaining the sustainable development goals through trade /developing-economies-and-trade/ Mon, 25 Feb 2019 09:22:50 +0000 http://vm-pluto:8080/?p=1295

SDG indicators
Goal 17: Partnerships for the goals

Target 17.11: Significantly increase the exports of developing countries, in particular with a view to doubling the least developed countries’ share of global exports by 2020.
Indicator 17.11.1: Developing countries’ and least developed countries’ share of global exports (Tier I)

Since 2020, the world has faced many crises, including climate change, the war in Ukraine, the ongoing war in Gaza, other geopolitical tensions, and food and energy insecurity, that disrupt trade flows and threaten progress towards the SDGs. The growth of global merchandise trade is slowing, and geopolitical fragmentation hampers industrialization efforts of developing economies.

In the report to the Sixteenth Conference of UNCTAD, Rebeca Grynspan, Secretary-General of UNCTAD underscored the role of trade as a critical engine for economic transformation, particularly for developing economies striving for inclusive growth and resilience -—
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—-. Strengthening productive capacities through trade is key to reducing vulnerability and enabling structural transformation.

Developing economies maintain a strong global export presence; LDCs still fall short of global export target

In 2024, developing economies accounted for 41% of global exports, up slightly from 40% in 2012. This stability underscores their enduring role in global trade, even amid shifting economic and geopolitical conditions.

SDG target 17.11 calls for a significant increase in developing countries’ exports, with a specific aim to double the share of LDCs in global exports from 1% in 2011 to 2% by 2020, a goal reaffirmed in the Istanbul -—
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—- Programmes of Action. Yet more than a decade later, progress has fallen short. In 2024, LDCs accounted for just 1.03% of global exports, up only marginally from 0.96% in 2012. These figures highlight the persistent structural barriers — limited diversification, weak infrastructure and small productive bases — that continue to constrain export growth in LDCs.

By contrast, SIDS increased their combined share of global exports of goods and services from 3.0% in 2012 to 3.4% in 2024, driven by gains in tourism, digital services, and creative sectors. While their overall share remains modest, this upward trend suggests the growing potential of services-led development pathways in vulnerable economies.

Figure 1. LDCs are not on track to reach SDG Target 17.11 to significantly increase their share in global exports Figure 1. LDCs are not on track to reach SDG Target 17.11 to significantly increase their share in global exports
Percentage of global exports (SDG 17.11.1)

Source: UNCTADstat -—
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Note: Data on trade in services for the latest year are preliminary annual estimates based on the most recent quarterly figures (BPM6). Data on trade in goods for the latest year are estimates based on Comtrade, international and national sources.

Only a few developing economies reach a notable share of global exports of goods and services.
Between 2014 and 2024, only a limited number of developing economies achieved notable gains in their share of global exports of goods and services. Djibouti recorded an eightfold increase, while Guinea’s share rose sixfold. Armenia and Sao Tome and Principe quadrupled their global export shares, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Viet Nam, and Cambodia tripled their export shares, and economies such as Niue, Mongolia, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan doubled theirs. China also expanded its share by 32%, reaching 12% in 2024 from 9% in 2011. In contrast, several developing economies, including Yemen, Lebanon, Guyana, Kiribati, Sudan, Suriname and Angola, experienced a decline in their global export shares over the same period.

Map 1. Only a limited number of developing economies reach a notable share of global exports of goods and services Map 1. Only a limited number of developing economies reach a notable share of global exports of goods and services
Percentage (SDG 17.11.1)

Source: UNCTADstat -—
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Note: Data on trade in services for the latest year are preliminary annual estimates based on the most recent quarterly figures (BPM6). Data on trade in goods for the latest year are estimates based on Comtrade, international and national sources.

No additional trade decoupling

U.S. - China trade ties showed no further decoupling in 2024.
In 2024, trade interdependence between the United States and China remained unchanged from 2023, with no further shifts in bilateral trade shares. The trend of geopolitical realignment, or friend-shoring, continued, but without additional decoupling. Between 2017 and 2024, the United States’ share of Chinese exports declined by more than 4 percentage points, largely due to the tariff escalations of 2018 and 2019. Similarly, China’s share of the United States’ imports contracted by 8 percentage points over the same period.

Figure 2. Bilateral trade dependence between China and the United States has stalled Figure 2. Bilateral trade dependence between China and the United States has stalled
Import and export dependence, percentage

Source: UNCTADstat -—
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—-, UN Comtrade Database -—
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Note: Year 2024 figures are provisional, based on national statistics. China export dependence on the United States is calculated as China exports to the United States over total China exports. The United States import dependence on China is calculated as United States imports from China over total United States imports. The overall trade interdependence is calculated as bilateral trade (imports + exports) of United States and China over the sum of total trade of the two economies.

References

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