The persisting lack of financing for sustainable development is worsening in 2025. With ODA falling for the first time in five years (down 7.1% in 2024), and a stagnant overall FDI to developing economies, with declines in 2024 observed in Latin America and the Caribbean (-12%) and Asia (-3%), as well as a drop of SDG-related investments (-26%), heads of state and government gather at FfD4 this year to discuss how to reshape the global financial architecture for sustainable development. South-South cooperation, grounded in peer-to-peer partnerships, knowledge exchange and non-financial support, plays a critical role in sustainable development for all, reinforcing other mechanisms, especially through mutual support, cooperation and knowledge sharing. The Bridgetown Covenant -—
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—- strongly emphasized the essential contribution of ODA, private investment, and South-South and triangular cooperation, in addressing the challenges related to development finance, including mounting debt of the most vulnerable economies.
Approaching UNCTAD 16, redefining international support to developing countries is high on the agenda. The following chapters address related challenges:
Early pilots showcase non-financial support is an essential South-South cooperation modality.
Investments in SDG-related sectors dropped 26% globally in 2024.
The external debt of developing economies reached $11.7 trillion in 2024.
Without reliable data, government efforts risk remaining ineffective or inadequate.
Heads of state and government gather at FfD4 this year1 to reshape the global financial architecture for sustainable development. Amid mounting global challenges, from geopolitical tensions and related refugee crises to climate shocks and systemic financial risks, the conference seeks to catalyse a renewed commitment to equitable and resilient financing. While ODA to developing economies is failing to reach commitments, new solutions are sought. South-South cooperation, grounded in peer-to-peer partnerships, knowledge exchange and non-financial support, plays a critical role in sustainable development for all, reinforcing other mechanisms.
Despite recent growth, longstanding aid commitments remain unmet. In 2024, ODA fell by 7.1% in real terms compared to 2023 – for the first time in five years – declining to $212.5 billion -—
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—- and representing just 0.33% of donor countries’ GNI2, a sharp reversal from previous modest gains.
Source: UNCTAD calculations based on -—
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Notes: 2024 is not shown in the LDCs graph as ODA data by detailed recipient are not yet available.
The previous increases of ODA were driven by conflict-related aid, e.g., to Ukraine, and in-donor refugee costs, and their decrease has contributed to the fall in 2024. This decline was further impacted by reduced contributions to international organisations and lower levels of humanitarian aid. Amidst these shifts, ODA with climate objectives has gradually increased over the past decade, reaching nearly $50 billion in 2021/2022 -—
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—-. Climate finance, a broader concept accounting for both bilateral and multilateral flows, including export credits and other public funds and mobilized private finance, surpassed $100 billion annually for the first time in 2022, hitting almost $116 million -—
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—-. Despite this strong growth, the urgency for developed economies to scale up climate finance provided to developing economies remains high, especially in light of evolving dynamics in international development cooperation.
South-South cooperation, alongside other international development support, is key to achieving the 2030 Agenda, but is the only form of development cooperation lacking systematic data. This hampers its strategic management and the effective allocation of flows to achieve sustainable development.
Source: UNCTAD.
Momentum to measure South-South cooperation is rapidly building following the endorsement of SDG indicator 17.3.1 in March 2022 at the UN Statistical Commission -—
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—-, and its voluntary ‘Conceptual Framework to Measure South-South Cooperation’ -—
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—-. Developed by the South for the South, the UN Framework can enable globally balanced, inclusive and representative information on development support through reporting of South-South data to the SDG indicator, first time alongside data on North-South flows which have existed for decades.
Interest in measuring South-South cooperation is quickly increasing. The first expert meeting in July 2023 in Brasilia brought together 16 member States, and in June 2024, 66 developing economies met in Doha. Four countries have reported preliminary South-South data in the ’Framework’ and eleven are pilot testing it in 2025 (map 1). Early data by pioneering countries confirm non-financial support as essential to South-South cooperation, with scholarships, humanitarian assistance and technical cooperation reported most frequently, targeting (ordered by number of reported activities) SDGs 4 (quality education), 9 (industry and innovation), 8 (decent work and economic growth), 17 (partnership for the goals) and 3 (enhancing health), showcasing the diversity of South-South cooperation.
Source: UNCTAD, ECA, ECLAC, ESCAP, ESCWA.
Note: Situation reflected on the map as of April 2025.
Bridging the financing gap to achieve the SDGs and facilitate long-term economic transformation requires effective mobilization and utilization of various financing sources. Many developing economies face challenges in mobilizing sufficient funds, often hindered by their inability to secure affordable borrowing for investment. As they transition to higher income groups, losing eligibility for concessional finance (or part thereof) can exacerbate these challenges, creating a greater incentive to engage in South-South cooperation, but also reliance on private financial markets.
Global FDI flows reached an estimated $1.5 trillion in 2024, an apparent increase of 4%. However, this headline figure is distorted by financial flows routed through European conduit economies1. Excluding these intermediary flows, global FDI actually fell by about 11% year-on-year -—
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—-. Global volatility of FDI appears to be flatlining in recent years, however FDI flows to developing economies, after having exhibited a flat trend since 2010, experienced a sharp increase in 2021-2022 (figure 1). 2023 saw a drop in FDI and 2024 remained flat compared to the year before for the global South, undermining progress on the SDGs, as these economies rely heavily on international financing. FDI declines in 2024 were observed in Latin America and the Caribbean (12%) and Asia (3%), while FDI increased in Africa, a record 75% rise -—
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Greenfield project announcements, primarily in industrial sectors, saw a moderate increase of 3% in number, yet fell 5% in value. Despite the drop, the value of greenfield projects remained high ($1.3 trillion), second only to the 2023 record value, driven primarily by investments in data centres and data processing. -—
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Investments in SDG-related sectors dropped sharply, by more than a quarter in 2024. Investment flows to developing economies for infrastructure fell 35%, renewable energy 31%, water and sanitation 30%, and agrifood systems 19%. Only the health and education sector saw growth (25%) -—
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—-. This underscores the persisting gap in attracting FDI to developing economies.
Mobilizing private sector finance is crucial to achieve the SDGs, with FDI playing a key role. FDI promotion is not solely the objective and responsibility of host economies; home economies can also support investment in developing economies and LDCs through dedicated OFDI promotion schemes. In this regard, SDG indicator 17.5.1 tracks the number of economies with OFDI promotion schemes for developing economies, including LDCs.
In 2024, at least 51 economies, including 21 emerging or developing economies, had in place at least one type of investment promotion mechanism for OFDI. This represented 71 per cent of developed economies and 15 per cent of developing economies. Among the economies with OFDI promotion mechanisms, an increasing number (27) had adopted schemes specifically targeting developing economies, including least developed economies. Globally, the most common mechanisms supporting OFDI were investment facilitation services (44 economies), followed by fiscal and financial support (38 economies), investment guarantees (35 economies) and State equity participation in foreign investment projects (25 economies) (figure 2).
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The external debt of developing economies reached $11.7 trillion in 2024, up from $11.4 trillion in 2023. Even though the value of total external debt continues to rise, the pace of that increase has slowed significantly since the COVID-19 pandemic, leading to moderate annual growth of 2.6% in 2024 – less than a third of the long-term average annual growth rate (8.4%) prior to the pandemic.
Source: UNCTAD calculations based on -—
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Note: Values in 2024 are estimated.
For developing economies as a group, the ratio of debt service on long-term external PPG debt to exports has been on an upward trend since 2010 (figure 1). The increase was particularly pronounced for the poorest: in 2024, the ratio was 13.5% for LDCs as a group, more than three times as high as in 2010 (3.5%) and also significantly higher than before the pandemic (9.7% in 2019). For the group of SIDS excluding Singapore, a group of particularly climate-vulnerable economies, this ratio increased sharply in 2020 as a result of decreasing services exports mainly due to falling tourism at the times of the lockdowns. After returning to its pre-pandemic level, the indicator has increased again since 2022, primarily due to higher debt servicing costs.
Source: UNCTAD calculations based on -—
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Notes: Values in 2024 are estimated. Groups follow -—
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—- classification by income level.
The ratio of external debt service to external debt – which considers the impacts of both maturity and interest costs – has been on a rising trend in the groups of the low, lower-middle and upper-middle income developing economies over the past decade (figure 2). The ratio was highest for upper-middle income economies, reaching 15.2% in 2024, as compared to 9.9% in 2014. Lower-middle income economies recorded a steady increase after the pandemic, with total external debt service rising to 12.5% of total external debt in 2024, up from 10.3% in 2020. The increase over the past decade was most pronounced in low income developing economies where this ratio rose from 3.8% in 2014 to 10.5% in 2024.
The 2030 Agenda identifies the reduction of IFFs as a priority, as reflected in target 16.4. This target is essential not only for financing the SDGs but also for ensuring economic sustainability. After global agreement on concepts and methods1, the first official estimates of IFFs were reported in 2023 revealing alarming volumes of funds crossing countries’ borders due to criminal activities.2 In addition, experimental estimates of tax and commercial IFFs also reveal significant flows, ranging from 5 to 30% of official goods trade in many African pilot countries. For instance, in Namibia, such flows were estimated to exceed 8% of GDP in 2022.3 If redirected into the formal economy, these illicit flows could serve as a vital source of funding for sustainable development, helping to bridge the financing gap -—
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—- and limiting the impact of the destabilizing international development assistance crisis.
Recognizing this, the UN General Assembly welcomed the first official estimates of IFFs based on internationally endorsed methodology. It called on co-custodian agencies, UNCTAD and UNODC, to strengthen support for member States, especially developing economies, by providing technical guidance and tools for data compilation and reporting, and invited all member States and international organizations to engage with the custodian agencies for more informed and effective policy action and reporting of data on SDG indicator 16.4.1 -—
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Source: UNCTAD and UNODC.
Note: Situation reflected on the map as of April 2025.
To date, 22 countries have piloted IFF measurement. Among them, 14 countries (12 in Africa and two in Asia) have tested methods to measure tax and commercial IFFs while nine countries have tested measuring IFFs from illegal market and exploitation activities.
Over the years, UNCTAD and partners have trained over 2 000 experts in analysing tax, customs, and banking transactions to identify sings of illicit finance. Dialogue between statisticians and policy makers is key to effective response. To this end, UNCTAD hosted a Joint Measurement and Policy Workshop6 in February 2025 in Geneva, bringing together 30 experts, including 13 women, from Ghana, Namibia, and Zambia and academic and research institutes. Findings shared at the seminar, illustrated high IFF risks related to the trade of raw minerals, like gold, manganese, copper, and uranium, and crude oil, as well as agricultural produce. Some countries revealed significant under-invoicing for certain critical minerals, such as copper or cobalt.
The experience of these countries shows that inter-agency collaboration is key in tracking and fighting IFFs. Institutionalizing platforms such as national coordination mechanisms, technical working groups, or establishing a dedicated IFF unit, strengthens both the measurement process and the broader governance of IFF data. These structures enhance transparency and help address persistent challenges, such as lack of data-sharing agreements and confidentiality constraints, as well as technical issues related to data coverage, quality, and interoperability. Building the capacity of key staff is crucial for effective tracking and curbing of IFFs. Equally important are the adoption of global standards for IFF reporting and reinforcing legal and institutional frameworks at the national level. Together these efforts support both the measurement and policy dimensions of combatting IFFs.
Source: UNCTAD and UNODC.
There is a growing political momentum to measure and monitor sustainable development more effectively and strengthen domestic resource mobilisation. 2025 is a crucial year to strengthen global dialogue and commitment at the FfD4. Countries are increasingly recognizing the high returns on data investment — estimated at an average of $32 for every $1 invested in strengthening data systems in developing economies -—
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—- — and the significant progress many countries have made in enhancing their national statistical systems. However, despite this momentum, investment in data remains insufficient, and as illicit finance continues to leak out of countries, including in the form of undervalued domestic natural resources, developing countries are seeking solutions to weak development financing. Efforts to track and recover resources lost to IFFs will be a central element in this discussion.